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engineered system of systems that proposes to use such distributed forces to provide 
forward presence, to gain and maintain access, to provide sea control, and to project 
combat power in the littoral regions of the world.   
Project CROSSBOW is the result of a yearlong, campus-wide, integrated research 
systems engineering effort involving 40 student researchers and 15 supervising faculty 
members.   
This report (Volume I) summarizes the CROSSBOW project.  It catalogs the 
major features of each of the components, and includes by reference a separate volume 
for each of the major systems (ships, aircraft, and logistics).  It also presents the results of 
the mission and campaign analyses that informed the trade-offs between these 
components.  It describes certain functions of CROSSBOW in detail through specialized 
supporting studies.   
The student work presented here is technologically feasible, integrated, and 
imaginative.   
This student project cannot by itself provide definitive designs or analyses 
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I.   CROSSBOW PROBLEM DEFINITION AND SCOPE 
CROSSBOW: A high-speed, rapidly deployable, integrated and distributed 
naval force with a primary mission of forward presence, littoral sea control, forced 
access, and access maintenance, in low to moderate threat environments around the 
globe.  CROSSBOW is capable of augmenting and enhancing carrier battle group 
operations in high threat environments. 
 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) CROSSBOW Report consists of five 
volumes, of which this is the first.  Volume I is a product of the Systems Engineering and 
Integration (SEI) curriculum.  It integrates and summarizes CROSSBOW’s elements and 
missions and provides conclusions and recommendations.  Volume II, a product of the 
Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) capstone design course, provides a detailed 
report of the SEA ARCHER ship design.  Volume III, a product of the Aeronautics and 
Astronautics Department’s capstone design course, is a detailed report of the SEA 
ARROW aircraft design.  Volume IV, a product of the NPS Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy, provides a CROSSBOW logistics framework.  Finally, Volume V is a 
repository for the SEI CROSSBOW Specialized Supporting Studies, as well as various 
background material and references.   
 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. CROSSBOW Project Inception  
The CROSSBOW project took shape at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 
response to an enquiry by the President of the Naval War College (NWC) in October 
2000.  The central intent was to investigate the extent to which new technology and a 
changing world should cause the Navy to rethink the relative merits of dispersion versus 
concentration and the attendant economies of scale with regard to naval forces.  
Specifically, he proposed that NPS examine the feasibility of, and potential for, the 
“CORSAIR,” a very small, high-speed aircraft carrier for distributed operations in littoral 
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waters.1  The NWC had developed the notional concept, which featured high-speed 
aircraft carriers as a complement to large carriers, with an emphasis on obtaining access 
when opposed in littoral waters.  Each CORSAIR would operate approximately seven 
Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) and two helicopters.  
NPS students and faculty were given wide latitude in the conduct of the study.  It 
is important to note that NWC provided no specific mission need.    Rather, the students 
were tasked with taking a hard-nosed, skeptical look at the possible capabilities of 
CORSAIR.  Briefing materials provided by the NWC and independent informal reviews 
of the NWC concept are presented in Volume V of this report. 
2. Timing 
An exploratory task of this magnitude required a level of interdisciplinary and 
interdepartmental collaboration not previously attempted at NPS.  Although recent 
curriculum and organizational changes at NPS made it feasible, project planning for the 
yearlong study was constrained by existing academic program schedules (ship and 
aircraft capstone design classes), the part-time nature of the effort, and faculty 
availability.  Therefore, some compromises and academic artificialities were unavoidable.  
 
3. Project Organization 
Figure 1 presents the NPS organizational elements contributing to the 
CROSSBOW project.  The Systems Engineering and Integration (SEI) Curriculum 
requires that a significant project be undertaken by the student team in lieu of the usual 
Master’s Thesis.  The second group of students enrolled in the curriculum, SEI-2, was 
assigned CROSSBOW as its integration project.   
 
                                                            
1  A 60-knot speed objective was imposed upon the team at the onset of the project.  In the course of 
the study it became evident that the 60-knot objective had serious implications on ship design and cost, 
apparently without commensurate tactical benefit.  Additional design iterations looking at a 40-50 knot 
range were not possible, given academic time constraints. 
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Figure 1. CROSSBOW Project Organization 
 
The Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) capstone ship design course, which 
draws from the Mechanical Engineering, Applied Physics, and Electrical Engineering 
Departments, provided the ship design team.  The Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Department’s capstone aircraft design course provided the aircraft design team.  Four 
students from the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy produced a thesis on the 
requirements and cost of CROSSBOW logistics and maintenance.  Two other supporting 
theses, one on a Free Electron Laser (FLE) as an “Electric Warship” weapon and the 
other on ship shock predictions for vulnerability and survivability, were contributed by 
the Physics and Mechanical Engineering Departments, respectively.   The Operations 
Research (OR) Department made a significant contribution by tailoring an existing 
campaign analysis course for the express purpose of evaluating a notional CROSSBOW 
force in scenarios representing the full spectrum of conflict.  Ten OR students were 
joined by the 15 SEI-2 and the four logistics students for this unique and productive 
course.  In addition, the Electrical and Computer Engineering (ECE) Department 




























design, avionics, electric drive, and electromagnetic interference.  Finally, the 
Meteorology and Oceanography Department contributed expertise and advice on 
seasonal and geographic effects on ship, aircraft, and sensor performance. 
Allied officer participation represented an important contribution to the 
CROSSBOW effort.  More than 50 percent of the SEI-2 students were combat officers 
from the Singapore Armed Forces, and roughly 20 percent of the TSSE ship design class 
members were naval officers from Turkey.  Valuable insight was gained from senior 
Naval leadership, Navy and government laboratories, and industry visitors who took time 
to participate in reviews and final briefings.  
4. Constraints  
Since NPS had been given no specific mission need for this effort, some students 
and several visitors believed that CROSSBOW was a solution looking for a problem.  
Instead, we considered it as a new operational concept for littoral warfare that required 
examination.  In order to conduct an analysis, a preliminary notional force needed to be 
quickly specified by the student/faculty team.  Due to academic schedules, much of the 
underlying operational analysis had to be done a full quarter after design efforts had 
commenced.  As a result, our campaign analysis findings did not influence the aircraft 
design at all, but they did influence the ship-design effort. 
Time constraints, coupled with faculty availability, led to the rapid development 
of several interim documents.  Aircraft- and ship-design teams both needed a first look at 
requirements in order to start their design efforts; therefore, these documents were 
prepared on a tight schedule.  These documents were not true Mission Need Statements 
(MNS), although they were labeled as such. Nor were they Operational Requirement 
Documents (ORD), though they had many elements normally found in an ORD.  There 
was little formal analysis associated with the initial documents.  They were circulated 
outside NPS for critical comment, which was useful, but, unfortunately, the documents 
seemed to have caused some confusion regarding the aim of the project.  The intent of the 
project was not to generate a CROSSBOW MNS or ORD, but to examine the feasibility 
of, and potential for, a student-derived concept—CROSSBOW, loosely akin to NWC’s 
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“Corsair.”   We hope this report will be helpful to those who might develop an MNS or 
an ORD in line with these concepts. 
 
B. FORCE LEVEL ASSUMPTIONS AND KEY CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Introduction 
This project was intended to assess a particular technological concept in a broad 
operational context.  Assumptions and key considerations were either imposed upon the 
design team by higher leadership or developed to provide critical design factors.  These 
directly impacted the CROSSBOW system. The key considerations represent a global 
view of the future and how certain technological trends will shape the Navy and the 
CROSSBOW system, in particular.  This section gives a quick understanding of the 
rationale behind certain design decisions and the premises upon which the initial concepts 
were crafted.  A more detailed discussion of key considerations may be found in Volume 
V. 
2. Assumptions Made While Defining the CROSSBOW Force 
a. Not a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) replacement 
CROSSBOW is not intended to and cannot replace the CVBG.  Rather, it 
is a complementary force, which can relieve CVBG operational commitments in low- to 
moderate-threat littoral regions.  CROSSBOW will have the capability to operate 
effectively as an independent force only in areas of low and moderate threat.    
b. Composed of “combat-consumable” units, supported forward 
As a group of many small combatants in a distributed environment, 
CROSSBOW is an asset readily deployable forward into littoral waters.  It can be put in 
harm’s way to take hits as a “combat consumable”2 in order to pave the way for other 
forces. 
c. Capable of high-speed operations, up to 60kts 
CROSSBOW is a high-speed, quick-response force. An operational speed 
of 60 knots was externally imposed as an operational attribute of the SEA ARCHER ship.  
                                                            
2 A term introduced to us by VADM Cebrowski. 
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While the value of a 60-knot top speed (vice, say, 50) is probably not worth the cost, high 
speed is critical to the CROSSBOW concept. 
d. A distributed force able to concentrate and disperse rapidly 
A dominant feature of CROSSBOW is its ability to concentrate and 
disperse rapidly. 
e. Threat projection is circa 2020 
The enemy used in our analysis is a generic force with a military 
capability set at year 2020.  
f. Key infrastructure is assumed in place 
For CROSSBOW to operate as a distributed force, the key infrastructure 
for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and logistics are assumed to be in place.  This serves to facilitate 
the analysis of distributed systems.  The unique requirements of CROSSBOW C4ISR and 
the logistics system will be addressed subsequently. 
g. Technology freeze dates of 2012 and 2020 
The technology freeze date for NPS Ship (SEA ARCHER), SEA LANCE 
II, and aircraft (SEA ARROW) design is set at 2012.  The technology freeze date for all 
other less-integrated subsystems and weapons is set at 2020. 
  3. Key Considerations  
a. Joint/Coalition Operations Constraints 
Almost all modern operations are Joint Operations.  CROSSBOW will 
have to be designed with Joint or coalition operations in mind. Examples include 
designing interfaces for communications with the Marines, Army, Air Force and other 
coalition multi-lateral forces.   
b. Extensive use of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technology 
Budgetary pressures and the acquisition climate will promote the use of 
COTS and joint cooperative development with industry.  
c. Need For Automation  
Since the 1980s, the U.S. Navy has experienced a downward trend in 
manning levels.  However, the number of tasks required of the military has actually 
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increased.  The use of automation to reduce manpower needs is an important 
CROSSBOW design consideration.  
d. Environmental Constraints 
Operations in the littorals are characterized by a high degree of clutter.  
The probability of an effective surprise attack is greatly increased in the littorals.  
Therefore, sensors onboard the CROSSBOW system must be able to detect these targets 
efficiently.  A study of the regions of potential conflict shows that CROSSBOW must 
survive and operate in inclement weather.  Increasing concerns for environmental safety 
impose efficiency requirements for the CROSSBOW system.  Limited supplies of energy 
resources require that CROSSBOW be designed with fuel efficiency in mind.  
Alternative means of energy storage or power production should be investigated. 
e. Nature of Future Warfare 
As illustrated by the events of September 11, 2001, future warfare will be 
characterized by asymmetric threats.  Similar asymmetric threats could be used against 
high-value naval assets.  In addition to asymmetric threats, results from the campaign 
analysis indicate that saturation tactics can overwhelm CROSSBOW.  The operational 
template for CROSSBOW must address both these issues in the context of future combat 
operations. 
f. Logistical Issues 
Due to reduction in U.S. overseas bases, CROSSBOW forces will have to 
rely on self-sustained logistics and/or Allies.  Therefore, CROSSBOW must be 
compatible with the infrastructure, rules, and regulations of overseas ports and bases.  
Logistics support of CROSSBOW’s surface combatants is a significant concern. 
CROSSBOW should include organic re-supply capabilities to reduce the burden on 
existing supply assets. 
C. CROSSBOW MISSION AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
1. Forward Presence 
The changing political climate places increased international demands on the 
United States, and there has been a growing demand for naval involvement in Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Small-Scale Conflicts (SSC).  This has 
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increased the Navy’s operational tempo and placed great strain on naval forces.  
Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs) of the Unified Commands all desire a higher level of 
presence in their respective theaters than the Navy can provide.   
CROSSBOW can be an effective independent and enabling force in areas of low 
to moderate threat where demands for firepower and operational coverage do not require 
the full-time presence of a carrier battle group (CVBG).  CROSSBOW’s distributed 
nature and speed can support some of the unfilled CINC operational commitments, while 
further expanding the Navy’s area of influence to more regions of national interest.     
2. The Littoral  
Littoral operations constitute a fundamental tenet in the Navy's maritime strategy, 
as articulated in Operational Maneuver From The Sea and Forward From The Sea.  
The littoral is defined in the CROSSBOW context as a region extending from 100nm 
from shore to 100nm inland.  This region is often cluttered with: coastal shipping and 
fishing, intense air traffic, oil rigs, small islands, shallow water influences, intense 
electronic radiation from land and sea (commercial and military), and a wide variety of 
threats from land, sea and air.  All these can have adverse implications for naval 
operations.  But demographic trends indicate that, by 2025, 90 percent of the world’s 
population will be concentrated in littoral regions.  Further, as numbers of U.S. overseas 
bases continue to decrease, the littorals must become the main access for the U.S. 
military into a crisis area. 
3. Access and Escalation  
The notion of littoral access can be viewed from different perspectives.  The 
warrior’s perspective is forcible access.  This requires firepower and power projection 
superior to the opponent's denial capabilities.  In contrast, the nearly continuous presence 
of a credible naval force in an area of national interest puts a nation in the more desirable 
position of access maintenance, thus reducing or negating the additional combat power 
needed to gain access.  Access maintenance has the inherent advantage of deterrence.  If 
necessary, however, it offers control of escalation when conflict becomes unavoidable.   
It is rarely in the national interest to destroy completely a belligerent’s defensive 
capability and communications infrastructure at the onset of conflict.  If this can be 
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avoided by measured escalation, then, in the end, postwar rebuilding and stabilization 
tasks will be less expensive and faster.  A small amount of combat power quickly applied 
can eliminate the need for larger forces that would arrive later. 
Presence, deterrence and escalation control are missions that require a proactive 
deployment of forces.  Forces performing these missions will find themselves in frequent 
small-scale exercises with allied nations or operating independently near-shore for days, 
weeks, or even months.  Under low- to moderate-threat conditions, a naval force such as 
CROSSBOW is well suited for these tasks. 
4. The CROSSBOW Advantage  
The CVBG remains the force of choice to provide maritime dominance in the 
open oceans of the world and power projection ashore.  It is also capable of effectively 
operating in the littorals, as are naval ARGs.  But the number and complexity of low- to 
moderate-threat littoral regions of national interest, the increasing need to engage and 
exercise with less-capable navies, and the projected threat shape an operational niche for 
a naval force oriented specifically to littoral operations.  The presence of this niche, 
combined with technological developments in unmanned vehicles and other forms of 
automation, led to the CROSSBOW concept. This specialized, low- to moderate-threat 
littoral force can potentially account for ten to 15 percent of the future naval force.3   
The United States Navy has recently begun to explore seriously the concept of 
small, distributed littoral combatants, first referred to as Street Fighter and now known as 
SEA LANCE4.  The concept currently lacks organic air cover and a viable scouting 
capability, both of which are critical for mission success5.  CROSSBOW combines a 
SEA LANCE variant, SEA LANCE II, with SEA ARCHER, a small, high-speed UAV 
Tactical Support Ship (TSS) or “very small aircraft carrier,”6 and SEA QUIVER, a 
notional high-speed support ship.  A significant synergistic effect is realized.   
                                                            
3 Comments by CAPT Wayne Hughes USN (Ret),  8 Nov 2001. 
4 The NPS TSSE program designed SEA LANCE in AY 2000.  The technical report is available at 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~me/tsse/files/2000.htm 
5 These issues were discovered during our campaign analyses, presented in Volume V. 
6 “Small aircraft carrier" may not be an appropriate description for SEA ARCHER.  Reasonable 
people might well prefer "UAV Tactical Support Ship", which perhaps, better describes the platform.  
However, for the purposes of this report, “small aircraft carrier”, “small high-speed aircraft carrier”, and 
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Although designed to operate independently in low- to moderate-threat 
environments, CROSSBOW can also complement the CVBG during theater war.  
CROSSBOW will be expected to tackle many of the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions 
in order to help prepare the battle-space for following operations.  It will be used to clear 
out and identify the coastal “clutter” and eliminate significant numbers of tactical targets 
in the littoral, freeing CVBG forces to focus on deep strike and more challenging targets.   
In short, CROSSBOW provides the “stunning” jab, while the CVBG delivers the 
“knockout” punch. 
a. CROSSBOW Strategic Advantage: Forward Deployment     
Capability 
The smaller ships of the CROSSBOW force can be forward deployed in 
packages sized for the region's threat and the level of national security interest.  This 
capability is also important for effective engagement with nations having smaller navies. 
CROSSBOW offers several tactical advantages.   
b. Enhanced Survivability  
CROSSBOW, as envisioned, has no “center of gravity” or single point of 
failure.  This characteristic:7 
§ Denies the enemy the ability to defend with a single maneuver. 
§ Denies the enemy the opportunity to concentrate firepower and effort. 
§ Builds robustness—allows fleet to retain significant combat potential even 
after sustaining some losses.  
§ Allows more continuous operations. 
c. Modularity and Flexibility  
The flexibility and maneuverability resulting from the distributed nature of 
the CROSSBOW force, operating in small force units, allow it to respond simultaneously 
to multiple skirmishes within an assigned operating area.   
d. Divided Assets, Integrated Firepower  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
“UAV Tactical Support Ship” are all synonymous descriptions of SEA ARCHER. 
7 “An Analysis of Distributed Combat Systems,” Keith, Jude, Ho; CROSSBOW Specialized 
Supporting Study, December 2001. 
 11 
CROSSBOW consists of 20 SEA LANCE II small combatants and the 
eight distributed SEA ARCHERs.  CROSSBOW conducts coordinated and simultaneous 
air operations and can rapidly launch one large pulse of airborne combat assets on a wide 
range of missions (128 unmanned vehicles; 16 MH-60s), or many ‘small’ to ‘medium’ 
packages around the clock. 
 The force brings the following to the fight: 
§ 1020 x VLS Tubes (small 15-25nm Standard Missile variant) 
§ 80 x Ship Launched HARPOON Missiles  
§ 1024 x Small Smart Bombs (per day –all SEA ARROWS dedicated) 8 
§ 768 x Air-to Surface Missiles (per day –all SEA ARROWS dedicated)  
§ 512 x HARM circa 2020 (per day –all SEA ARROWS dedicated)  
§ 200 x ASROC (assumes 10 per SEA LANCE II) 
 This is a significant lethality, roughly comparable to a CVBG, but for only 
a single pulse. 
e. Enemy Targeting Dilemma 
 CROSSBOW complicates the enemy’s information and target acquisition 
processes, through its numbers, size, and individual ship capabilities.   
5. CROSSBOW Missions and Operational Concepts 
CROSSBOW is designed to perform a myriad of missions and tasks in order to 
achieve its primary mission.  A summary, organized by conflict type, is presented in 
Figure 1.  Following are some CROSSBOW mission capabilities, also organized by 
conflict type.  The final CROSSBOW force description is presented in Table 1. 
                                                            
8 SEA ARCHER magazine capacity not considered – these are maximum numbers by type.  Trades 




SEA ARCHER:  Small High-speed UAV Carrier (45-60 knots ~600 ft / 14-15K LT)9 
 
Terminal Defense: 
 Candidate Systems 
o Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) 
o Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) Weapons 
o Free Electron Laser (FEL) 
o Small-caliber stabilized gun 
o Enhanced Ship Self Defense System (ESSDS)  
o SRBOC decoy launching system 
o Laser mine detection and avoidance system 
SEA ARCHER Air Wing:   
o 8 x SEA ARROW (6 operational / 2 spares)10 
o Designed for armed reconnaissance 
o 15,000 lbs each 
o Modular weapons payload11 
1. 4 x 250lb small Smart Bombs 
2. 2 x AMRAAM AIM120 (350lbs ea.) 
3. 1 x Gun Pod – GPU-2A (M197) (600 lbs) 
4. 2 x HARM (Inboard ~1000lbs ea.)  
5. 3 x Jammer pods - new design (current ALQ-99 ~1000lbs ea.) 
6. 3 x Anti-Ship Missiles (ASM) current Air Launched Harpoon Inboard~1000lbs ea. 
7. Combinations of 3 variants of air -launched MCM ROVs 
• ~ 500lbs each 
• Hunter / Processor / Neutralizer 
• Helicopter or ship recovery 
8. Laser mine hunting module (<2500 lbs) 
o 8 x Multi-mission support UAVs (~500 lb payload) 
o Med Altitude / Med Endurance (min - 8hrs on sta.) 
o Modular Payload  
1. Airborne Communications Node (ACN) 
2. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, & Targeting  (ISR&T) 
3. Airborne Early Warning (AEW) (limited range capability) 
o Estimated max gross weight ~8000lbs 
o 2 x MH-60 Multi-mission helicopters 
o Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD) 
o Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) 
o Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
o Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) 
o Anti-surface Warfare (ASUW) 
SEA LANCE II:  Small high-speed combatant (45-55 knots ~180 ft / 600-650 LT) – higher speed version of original 
SEA LANCE design without the tow – result of campaign analysis. 
                                                            
9 NPS Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) designed ship 
10 NPS Aeronautical Engineering Department designed UCAV 
11 At max fuel load (4300lbs) only 1500lbs of ordnance can be carried; however, at 50% fuel, range 
still exceeds 400nm and payload can be increased to 3550lbs.  Only the 1st three payloads listed were 
investigated by the Aero design team, the remainder, are payloads Sea Arrow should be able to carry based 
on its basic performance characteristics. 
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o ~48-60 hours endurance 
o SPY-3 Radar variant circa 2020 
o 3 x Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) 
o 1 for ASW 
o 2 for MCM 
o ~1000 lbs ea. 
o Armament: 
o 51 SM-X (SM-X = small, vertical launched, multi-purpose, 15 nm weapon) 
o Anti-Submarine Rocket System (ASROC) or circa 2020 equivalent 
§ May require trading SM-X missiles for space – depends on ship size 
o 4 x Harpoons 
o 2 x 30mm Gun 
Can refuel from SEA ARCHER or SEA QUIVER 
SEA QUIVER:  High-speed CROSSBOW support ship (35-40 knots ~700 ft / ~25K LT – Full load) 
o ½ AOE-6 baseline 
o ~10K tons fuel 
o Strictly a notional ship 
Force Composition by Scenario12:  By taking a notional force structure and conducting a series of campaign 
analysis mini-studies, the CROSSBOW force composition was tested.  Sensitivity analysis resulted in the proposed 
force composition by scenario (Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW); Small Scale Conflict (SSC); 
Major Theater War) below. 
 
Table 1.  CROSSBOW Force Composition 
                                                            
12 Force composition is very scenario dependent.  These results are only valid for the limited scenarios 
evaluated during student’s Campaign Analysis class (see section II).  Therefore, these numbers should be 
used with caution. 
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a. MOOTW: Humanitarian Missions and Crisis Response and 
Suppression 
CROSSBOW could provide the following: 
§ Surveillance of littoral area of interest through use of UAV and ACN13 
(Airborne Communications Node); 
§ Supplemental communications for local authorities where appropriate; 
§ Temporary emergency transportation where necessary; 
§ Physical protection where necessary through use of UCAV (Unmanned 
Combat Aerial Vehicle) and firepower where appropriate. 
§ Peacetime Search and Rescue Operations. 
 
 
Figure 2. CROSSBOW Missions 
 
b. Anti-Piracy and Drug Interdiction Operations14 
CROSSBOW may be used to provide the following: 
§ Intelligence through use of surveillance assets; 
                                                            
13 Unmanned airborne communications modules acting as communications relay.  Refer to Specialized 
Supporting Study by Foo Khee Loon in Volume V. 
14 Depending on the threat involved, anti-piracy can be regarded as SSC or MOOTW 
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§ Engagement and, if necessary, destruction of identified offenders through use 
of UCAVs or SEA LANCE II; 
§ UAV tracking of pirates and drug traffickers; 
§ Conduct of offensive operations against identified shore bases of offenders;  
§ Protection for potential victims of piracy through presence (deterrence) and 
swift response. 
 
c. Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs): b.  Maritime Embargoes,   
Protection of SLOCS and Fast Maritime Escorts 
CROSSBOW may be used in littoral operations to: 
§ Provide reconnaissance and constant surveillance through use of UAVs, 
UCAVs and SEA LANCE II; 
§ Support Coast Guard boarding and inspection teams; 
§ Engage forces that contravene agreements and treaties; 
§ Provide subsurface surveillance, localization, and prosecution through use of 
helicopters, SEA LANCE II and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs); 
§ Protect and provide assistance to Allied commercial or military shipping. 
§ Accompany High Speed Vessels (HSVs) carrying Marine or Army forces to a 
scene of action and provide combat support in a SSC. 
 
c.  Anti-Terrorist Operations  
 CROSSBOW may be used in anti-terrorist operations to: 
§ Conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) 
operations in support of US Homeland Defense authorities; 
§ Use SEA LANCE II or UCAVs to provide physical security / screening 
against potential suicide boats or aircraft; 
§ When directed, use offensive firepower to engage and destroy identified 
terrorist assets at sea, on the land or in the air. 
 
d.  Special Operations 
CROSSBOW would provide: 
§ ISR&T intelligence for planning; 
§ Special Operations team transportation via SEA ARCHER, SEA LANCE II, 
or combat support helicopters (MH-60); 
§ Special Operations team rescue capability; 
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§ Firepower to engage and destroy enemy targets, where directed, in support of 
Special Operations;  
§ Airborne and sea borne logistics support. 
 
e.  Major Theater War (MTW) – Supplementing a CVBG 
CROSSBOW could work with (supplement) and complement a 
conventional fleet in the following manner: 
(1) Transition Phase.  CROSSBOW can transit ahead of or in 
company with the CVBG using CROSSBOW assets to assist in: 
§ Airborne Early Warning;  
§ ISRT 
§ Offensive and Defensive Counter Air; 
§ Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW); 
§ Vertical Onboard Delivery; 
§ ASW localization;  
§ Layered defense; 
§ Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD); 
§ Destruction of Anti-Surface Missile (ASM) batteries. 
 
(2) Pre-Ops Phase. This includes gathering of intelligence; use of 
UCAVs to provide armed coastal and littoral reconnaissance; use of SEA LANCE II to 
provide short range air defenses for the CVBG, if necessary; and clearing the cluttered 
surveillance picture created by small coastal traffic and fishing boats. 
(3) Operations.  The main aim of CROSSBOW when operating 
with a CVBG in MTW is to find and open a suitable stretch of the littorals for follow-on 
forces to conduct further operations.15  To accomplish this, CROSSBOW may be used in 
the following manner: 
§ Multiple probes along the littorals to locate suitable areas for follow-
on operations; 
§ SEA ARROWs (UCAV) for SEAD to allow follow on air forces 
unrestricted passage into the area of operations; 
                                                            
15 Follow-on operations may include landing ground troops to execute operational maneuver from the 
sea, or for the CVBG to approach the land to provide deep strikes into enemy territory. 
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§ Helicopters (MH-60) and other mine clearing assets (UUVs) to allow 
follow-on sea forces unrestricted passage into enemy littoral waters; 
§ UUVs and ASROC from SEA LANCE II for ASW; 
§ SEA ARROWs to engage enemy air assets; 
§ SEA LANCE II to provide an additional layer of air defense for the 
battle group; 
§ SEA ARROWs to engage enemy ships (ASUW); 
§ SEA ARROW to deliver of ordnance on tactical targets in the littorals 
to free CV assets for deep strike missions; 
§ SEA ARROW to provide additional armed reconnaissance capability 




D. MILITARY THREAT ASSESSMENT 
 
1. Threat Overview 
In 2020, military threats16 will generally feature upgraded and improved versions 
of existing weapon systems.  However, weapon developers around the world will exploit 
commercial technology17 to achieve significant improvements in the following areas: 
§ Satellite-centered C4ISR; 
§ Missile defense; 
§ Reduced signatures (stealth); 
§ Information Warfare; 
§ Laser and Directed Energy Weapons; 
§ Anti ship cruise missiles; 
§ NBC  (Nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons18. 
                                                            
16 This section focuses primarily on military threats from nation-states.  Certainly non-state actors, 
such as terrorist organizations and drug cartels, can also pose national security threats.  However, as 
military operations following September 11, 2001 illustrate, strength of the cooperating nation-states can be 
a major determinant of the capabilities of non-state threats.  They have a great deal to do with resources 
available and security of organizational infrastructure. 
17 A large body of literature identifies areas of commercial technology development with military 
potential. Most notably are Computers (including software and hardware research), Telecommunications 
Equipment, Biotechnology, Chemicals, Aviation, and Space. 
18 Though outlawed by international agreements and treaties, the recent spate of anthrax attacks in the 
United States, and its apparent difficulty in coping with such an attack, will inevitably appeal to potential 
adversaries and encourage further research and developments into such technologies.  
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Also, advances in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, 
and superconductors can introduce the following capabilities: 
§ Long-range, precision-guided missiles and unmanned vehicles; 
§ Robots performing rudimentary tasks—e.g., clearing and laying of  
minefields; 
§ More effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum; 
§ Cheap Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs); 
§ Very stealthy submarines with long-range (>500NM) torpedoes. 
Given the rapid development and proliferation of technology, we can expect that 
future adversaries will be able to exploit these technologies and employ the following 
strategies, tactics and weapon systems in future military engagements: 
§ Saturation and exhaustion of defenses with missiles and other standoff  
weapons;  
§ Anti-Satellite Weapons; 
§ Small, fast, and expendable combatants; 
§ Sophisticated forms of mine warfare 
§ Violation of existing treaties and other international norms. 
 
Results from our Campaign Analysis studies and discussions with senior officers 
and members of the Naval Postgraduate School faculty reaffirmed that the projected 
threats listed above are realistic. 
A summary of key findings is listed below in the following subsections: (2) 
Current General Threat; (3) Potential Adversaries’ Future Combat Potential; (4) Potential 
Adversaries’ Capabilities Under Discontinuous Change; and (5) Considerations from 
Campaign Analysis. 
2. Current General Threat 
We expect that future engagements at sea, especially in the littorals, must contend 
with threats from Air, Land and Sea arms.  However, naval threats will likely be the main 
concern for CROSSBOW.  While, for a number of reasons, a comprehensive assessment 
of threats to CROSSBOW is beyond the scope of this study, we’ve used China as an 
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upper-bound proxy for naval threats to operations in littoral regions.19  As this section 
indicates, the current threat, though worrisome, is not a serious challenge to U.S. sea 
control, except in the littoral areas.  However, there are serious efforts underway to (a) 
make that challenge in the littorals and (b) move it outward to the blue-water arena. 
a. Blue Water and Power Projection Capabilities 
China, a major weapon developer and supplier, is now replacing older, 
slower ships with newer destroyers and frigates20.  Most of the ships are Russian, or 
based on Russian designs, and capable of speeds of 30-35 knots. The latest acquisitions 
include units from the Russian Soveremenny class, which has three times the endurance 
of the Luda class and twice that of the Luhu class—with corresponding increases in blue-
water and power projection capabilities.  It is probable that the combat systems and 
technologies mentioned throughout this section will be made available to other nations, 
as well.  In any case, CROSSBOW force will have to deal with such forces while 
deploying. 
b. Sea Denial and Coastal Defense Capabilities 
The most lethal anti-ship missile in the PLAN21 inventory is the 
supersonic Moskit SS-N-22.  Besides anti-ship missiles, the Sovremenny, Luhai and Luhu 
classes of ship also carry torpedo tubes for anti-ship and anti-submarine purposes.  
The submarine corps is one of the most significant PLAN combat arms.  It 
is regarded as a highly cost-effective means for guarding Chinese maritime boundaries.  
The main anti-ship submarine in the littoral area is the Kilo class submarine. It has six 
533 mm torpedo tubes, 18 53-system homing or wire-guided torpedoes, 24 AM-1 
underwater mines or eight SA-N-5 "Arrow" standby anti-aircraft missiles.  
PLAN mine stockpiles include vintage Russian moored-contact and 
bottom-influence mines, as well as an assortment of domestic types.  China is believed to 
have acoustically activated remote control mine technology.  This technology could allow 
                                                            
19 A more detailed analysis of threats in the year 2020 can be found in Volume V of this report.  
20 A number of these vessels are expect to be domestically produced. 
21 People’s Liberation Army Navy – The Naval Arm of the Chinese Military. 
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dormant mine fields to be laid in advance of hostilities and to be activated or deactivated 
as required.  
The PLANAF22 has about 540 aircraft of different types.  There are 11 air 
bases under the North Sea fleet, seven under the South Sea Fleet, and 13 within a 250-
mile radius of Taiwan, with approximately 180 fighters.  The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 
and the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) combined number over 400,000 personnel, 
4,300 tactical fighters, 1,000 bombers and close air support aircraft, and 650 transport 
aircraft.  However, the vast majority of the fighters are obsolete. The only fourth-
generation aircraft currently in China’s inventory is the Su-27 FLANKER.  By 2005, PLA 
fourth-generation fighter aircraft are expected to number about 150 and constitute only 
about four percent of the fighter force. 
The PLANAF currently has no confirmed Precision-Guided Munitions 
(PGMs) capability.  Moreover, only its B-6D bombers and FB-7 fighter-bombers have a 
standoff strike capability.  Finally, China’s air defense forces will probably be limited to 
point defenses since there is no integrated national air defense network.  
Coastal defense will also involve the PLAN Coast Guard, which is 
equipped with air defense, anti-ship missiles and gun batteries.  It also has artillery units 
and 25 surface-to-surface missile regiments.  The Coast Guard also operates the coastal 
surveillance system, which includes radars. 
c. Electronic and Information Warfare Capabilities 
The bulk of Chinese Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment embodies 
1950s-1980s technologies, with only a few select military units receiving the most 
modern components.  China's Information Operations (IO)/Information Warfare (IW) is 
in the early stages of research. It currently focuses on understanding IW as a military 
threat, developing effective countermeasures, and studying offensive employment of IW 
against foreign economic, logistics, and C4I systems. 
                                                            
22 People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force – The Naval Aviation Arm of the Chinese Military. 
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China has the capability to launch military photo-reconnaissance satellites.  
However, by Western standards, the technology is outdated.  In particular, Beijing does 
not currently possess a real-time photoreconnaissance capability.  
3. Nature of Future Threats 
In general, future combat potential will combine current capabilities with new 
technology and combat equipment.  It is likely that most military organizations will 
engage opposing naval forces first with low- to medium-performance systems, so as to 
exhaust the defenses, and then attack with a wave of high-performance systems.23  
Therefore, as technology advances, especially in guidance and range, the U.S. Navy is 
likely to face increasingly effective saturation attack threats.   
The airborne threat to naval assets will likely comprise:  (1) a few high-altitude 
aircraft attacking with precision guided bombs, missiles, and torpedoes; and (2) many 
low-altitude, mostly unmanned aircraft equipped with precision avionics and electronics 
to disrupt communications and/or targeting, as well as weapons to destroy critical C2 
nodes. 
Future submarines will be extremely quiet.  By 2020, state-of-the-art submarines 
will become so quiet that detection can occur because of the absence of natural ocean 
sound.  This will be overcome by ocean-masking technology that transmits the missing or 
blocked sounds at the proper amplitude.  
We can expect great powers such as China, and smaller powers as well, to 
undertake energetic programs to exploit current and emerging technologies in 
modernizing their forces over the next quarter century. 
a. Less Conventional Threats 
In all likelihood, threats to deployed U.S. forces will not be limited to high 
technology.  Many countries will lack the financial resources and foresight to develop, 
build and field weapons such as those listed above.  This class of future rivals requires 
attention also. 
                                                            
23 Volume 5 discusses in more detail additional capabilities that China will likely possess by 2020. 
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Chemical, Biological and other unconventional weapons can become 
weapons of choice for those states or organizations that prefer terrorist or rogue style 
attacks.  In view of the events of September 11, 2001, it is clear that distributed threats 
are also dangerous and real.  It is educational to view the attack from a military 
perspective.  In this case, we can see the difficulties that any force would have dealing 
with a highly distributed, technologically sophisticated threat intent on attacking the 
center of gravity of any system it wishes to destroy. 
4. Insights From Campaign Analyses 
Campaign analysis provided a number of insights regarding both the probable 
threats and potential counters.  The most important are listed here. 
Submarines will continue to be a serious threat to any surface fleet even with an 
effective ASW capability.  The submarine’s first-launch capability makes ASW 
operations especially difficult to execute well. 
Mine warfare is a very real threat.  While it is difficult to simulate physical 
effects, the mere presence of mines delays attacking forces and requires the commitment 
of significant resources for clearing and avoiding the mines.  
High degree of reliance on satellites for command and control operations is a 
“center of gravity,” which, upon destruction, would significantly reduce the capability 
and staying power of U.S. naval forces.  
Saturation is one of the key methods of countering a technically superior enemy. 
In our analysis, numerous small combatants attacking simultaneously could damage or 
destroy a significant portion of the CROSSBOW battle group.  “Quantity has a quality all 
of its own.”24 
Aircraft can inflict a great deal of damage on a surface fleet. Hence, one of the 
more important lessons or challenges is to ensure that the CROSSBOW UCAV will have 
air-to-air as well as anti-ship capabilities.  
A single Free Electron Laser on each CROSSBOW ship would handle a close-in 
threat much better than current defensive systems would. Likewise, it is reasonable to 
                                                            
24 Comment attributed to Josef Stalin. 
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expect that, should a competitor successfully field such a system, CROSSBOW offensive 
capability would be significantly reduced.   
5. Bottom-Line Assessment 
Taking China as a proxy for potential threats, we’ve found only limited capacity 
to contest sea control beyond the littoral region bordering that country.  However, we can 
expect PLAN combat capabilities to improve greatly between now and 2020, especially 
in its ability to engage in power-projection missions.  It will very likely have steadily 
increasing capabilities to contest U.S. sea control in both littoral and blue-water arenas.  
Furthermore, we can expect other powers to behave in a similar manner.  Although not 
all nations have China’s economic potential, they will have access to the same technology 
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 II.   CROSSBOW CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS 
 
This section provides an overview of CROSSBOW Campaign Analysis and the 
results that affect the CROSSBOW force structure, missions, and capability 
requirements.  Student briefs on each scenario, along with detailed explanatory notes, are 
presented in Volume V. 
A. THE JOINT CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS COURSE 
The NPS Operations Research (OR) Department offers the Joint Campaign 
Analysis course, primarily to Operations Analysis (OA) and Operations Logistics (OL) 
students.  The course objective is to study: 
the development, use and state-of-the-art of campaign analysis in actual 
procurement and operations planning.  The emphasis is on formulating the 
problem, choosing assumptions, structuring the analysis, and measuring 
effectiveness.25    
During the summer quarter 2001, this course was tailored expressly to evaluate a notional 
CROSSBOW force in scenarios representing the full spectrum of conflict.  Ten OA 
students joined 15 SEI-2 and four logistics students for this unique and productive course.   
1. What is Campaign Analysis?  
Campaign Analysis is the study of the first-order effects generated by a conflict 
between heterogeneous forces in a series of encounters conducted over time and covering 
a wide geographic area.26   
It presents its users with a variety of tools, techniques and procedures to 
assist in military planning.  It finds most applicability in a world where the 
threat is uncertain and the situation fluid.  In its purest form, Campaign 
Analysis makes use of simple mathematical or logical relationships to 
model battle encounters.  This is the academic analog of a commander on 
the field trying to calculate how much, and what forces he needs to 
commit in order to win a battle.27 
 
                                                            
25 Naval Postgraduate School 2001 General Catalog 
26 Joint Campaign Analysis, Book I – Student Text, Naval Postgraduate School, OR Department, 6 
Dec 99. 
27 “…of Bishops, Knights, and Pawns…”, Keith Jude Ho, Naval Postgraduate School, Oct 2001. 
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      2. Naval Salvo Model28 
Several of the CROSSBOW scenarios involved combat encounters with emphasis 
on surface search and strike.  The Naval Salvo Model was the primary tool used by the 
student teams to analyze CROSSBOW forces.  It presents a naval engagement as an 
exchange of missiles, accounting for both fleets’ total offensive capability, defensive 
capability, and staying power. 
      3. Limitations of Campaign Analysis 
Campaign analysis is a decision support tool, where results, granularity, specific 
inputs and accurate assumptions are required.  Scenarios and model inputs must be 
rigorously understood because they affect the analytical results.  Results are highly 
scenario-dependent, and the more detail one wishes to obtain, the greater the dependence 
on scenario-specific inputs.  The old “Garbage-in = Garbage-out” analogy works as well 
for Campaign Analysis as it does elsewhere.  Hence, numerical results from Campaign 
Analysis must be used with caution.  No attempt to treat numbers and figures with 
“biblical” rigidity was intended.  Rather, significant trends and concept validation are the 
useful products drawn from the numerical results.  
4. Student Mini-Studies 
At the conclusion of the Joint Campaign Analysis course, faculty put students to 
the test with small-team mini-studies. These studies force the students to apply the tools 
and methods learned.  In the case of CROSSBOW, a small student-faculty team 
developed five relevant scenarios.  Those scenarios were examined by seven student 
teams (two scenarios received double attention).  Each student team consisted of two 
SEI-2 students, at least one OA student, and in four cases, a logistics student. 
B. CROSSBOW MINI-STUDIES 
1. Mini-Studies Objectives 
                                                            
28 Developed by Capt Wayne Hughes of the Naval Postgraduate School.  More commonly known as 
the HUGHES SALVO EQUATIONS. 
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The objective of the assigned set of mini-studies was to derive collective insights 
as to the feasibility and suitability of a very small aircraft carrier as a complement to the 
main U.S. Navy carriers and missile striking forces regarding: 
§ Missions and tasks of the aircraft ("SEA ARROW") flying from the carrier 
("SEA ARCHER") and accompanied by a logistics capability ("SEA 
QUIVER”) in cooperation with an inshore combatant capability ("SEA 
LANCE"), which together are known as "CROSSBOW." 
§ Attractive combinations of each force element, some viable tactics for the 
combinations, and the Intelligence, Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) and 
Command and Control (C2) networks implied by the force configurations. 
By design, the mini-studies did not analyze cost effectiveness, nor did they 
include any trade analyses between CROSSBOW and other elements of the Navy. 
All scenarios took place in the year 2020. This is far enough in the future to 
design a CROSSBOW force for littoral warfare with an initial operating capability (IOC) 
of 2012 and to construct the forces in sufficient numbers to play in the scenarios.  Table 3 
presents the notional CROSSBOW force structure used for the scenarios.  Student teams 
were given the latitude to make their own assumptions where additional detail was 
necessary for a specific analysis.  Additionally, teams altered configurations, payloads, 








• 8 x SEA ARCHERs - Small High-speed (60 knots) UAV Carrier 
 
• SEA ARCHER Air Wing: 
o 8 x SEA ARROW (UCAVs) 
§ 4 configured for strike 
§ 2 configured for SEAD 
§ 2 configured for Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance & 
Targeting (ISR&T) 
o 8x UAVs for surveillance and C3 
o 2 x MH-60 Multi-mission Helicopters OR 2 AH-1Z Attack Helicopters 
 
• 20 x SEA LANCE 
o 51 SM-x Dual Purpose Missiles (surface-to-surface & surface-to-air) 
o 4 Harpoon Missiles 
o 30 mm Gun 
Note: SEA LANCE (SL) was designed by NPS in 2000 and it included a tow that 
contained the Expeditionary Warfare Grid, however the tow portion of SL was not 
employed for the purposes of the CA class.  
SEA QUIVERs – numbers driven by analysis results - Same capacity as ½ an AOE-6 
Table 2.  Notional Crossbow Force Composition 
 
            2. Mini-study Scenarios of Military Operations Other than War 
(MOOTW) and Small Scale Conflict (SSC) 
 a. Maritime Support of Allies: Convoy Operations in the 
Mediterranean 
In this scenario, Israel is attacked by a coalition of Arab states, and Turkey 
comes to Israel's aid.  The U.S. is asked to keep the air- and sea-lanes open for vital 
cargoes throughout the length of the Mediterranean. There is no CVBG available nearer 
than Norfolk, and the European Union stays neutral.  U.S. forces consist of four Aegis 
ships, four SSNs, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), CLF ships, 
and CROSSBOW. 
b. Anti-Piracy Operations in the Malacca Straits 
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A CROSSBOW force, using Singapore as a base of operations, conducts 
operations to suppress piracy in the Straits of Malacca.  In one variation, Indonesia 
permits SOF raids on pirate strongholds in Sumatra that have been identified by air and 
sea surveillance. 
c. Response to Multiple Insurrections in Indonesia 
 Instability in Indonesia leads to an outbreak of several insurrections on various 
islands.  CROSSBOW forces are dispatched in reaction. 
3. Mini-study scenarios of Theater War (TW) and Major Theater War 
(MTW) 
a. Maritime Conflict in the Mediterranean 
Two U.S. Allies in the Mediterranean are poised for a major showdown 
over islands in the Aegean Sea.  The U.S. is committed to deterring conflict by providing 
a naval presence in the region.  Should deterrence fail, the U.S. is poised to strike against 
the aggressor nation.  U.S. Forces include CROSSBOW, AEGIS ships, and a Carrier 
Battle Group.  The operation is conducted in the littorals with U.S. Forces prepared to 
combat the aggressor along her own coast.  Aggressor assets are mainly land-based attack 
aircraft, destroyers with missiles, missile ships, patrol craft and submarines.  
b. Peer Competitor (Independent Maritime/Forestalling 
Operations) 
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is a dominant force in East Asia.  
As of 2015, Taiwan has reunified with the PRC.  The PRC has acquired a formidable sea 
denial capability, and due to trade and dependency on oil imports it is in the process of 
building a sea control capability in East Asia and the South China Sea.  Their aim is to 
envelop Malaysia and Singapore by first seizing the Spratleys.  As the scenario unfolds, 
they have positioned a company of infantry, a battery of 16 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles 
(ASCMs), and two squadrons of fighter/attack aircraft on the Spratleys, with further 
buildup imminent.  A substantial part of the 2020 PRC Navy, consisting mainly of coastal 
craft, destroyers, frigates, and diesel submarines, defends the approaches and sea lanes to 
transform the Spratleys into a bastion and subsequent use as a springboard into Malaysia. 
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The U.S. has decided to employ CROSSBOW forces, two CG-47s, and 
two SSNs based in Singapore to disrupt and forestall the impending buildup.  U.S. 
surveillance provides strategic and operational intelligence, but not tactical (targeting) 
information.  The nearest CVBG is a seven-day transit away.  Singapore has committed 
to support the U.S. Navy militarily and logistically.  Major U. S. forces will be dispatched 
immediately, the nearest of which are U.S. Air Force long-range bombers in Guam and 
other forces in Japan, Okinawa and Hawaii.  There are no U.S. forces in a reunified 
Korea. 
c. Peer Competitor (CROSSBOW as a Complement to the CVBG) 
This scenario is the same as (b) above, with the exception that there are 
two carrier battle groups in the area and the CROSSBOW force joins with the CVBGs.  
However, the PRC ground and air presence in the Spratleys is now increased to a brigade, 
50 ASCMs, plus six squadrons of fighter/attack aircraft, all in well-protected and 
hardened sites.  Additionally, one-half of the presumptive 2020 PRC naval forces are 
committed. 
 
C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Universal Findings29 
a. Numbers Can Buy Staying Power30 
An analysis of staying power showed that in most cases adding one ship to 
the distributed force was equivalent to increasing the forces’ per-unit average staying 
power by about 12 percent (this, of course, varies by scenario). 
b. Littoral Warfare  
In littoral warfare, where the enemy can be expected to have large 
numbers of missile boats, a distributed task force will outperform a task force that has 
                                                            
29 Universal findings, as presented here, are an edited version of those presented in “An Analysis of 
Distributed Combat Systems”, a CROSSBOW Supporting Study by Keith Jude Ho, which can be found in 
Volume V of this report. 
30 Staying power is defined as the number of missile hits (or weight of ordnance) needed to put a ship 
out of action. 
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most of its assets concentrated in a few platforms. The Measure of Performance used in 
this case was the fraction of forces surviving after missile exchanges. 
c. A Complementary Strategy 
When distributed forces were used as a complement to the “un-balanced” 
or concentrated fleet, the overall survival fraction significantly improved.  This was 
shown mathematically with the Salvo Equations and the other models used.  The reason 
this occurs is that when both forces are used together, the distributed task force “dilutes” 
the enemy’s fire and draws away some missiles, which would otherwise have been 
targeted only at the high-value targets. 
 d. Area of Coverage and Response Time 
In operations that cover a large area, a distributed force is preferable.  This 
finds particular relevance in anti-piracy operations and similar missions.  It is important 
to note that for a distributed force to be effective, not only must it be able to disperse, but 
it also must be able to concentrate on demand.  Therefore, we conclude that an effective 
distributed force is one that is able both to disperse and concentrate on demand.  The rate 
with which dispersion and concentration must occur was not clear from the mini-study. 
e. Logistical Limitations   
A ship constructed for use in a distributed fleet must be small, which 
limits endurance, range and payload.  Therefore, a distributed force must be 
complemented by an appropriate logistics concept in order for it to be effective. 
2. Specific Findings 
a. SEA ARCHER 
§ Terminal Defense: Results indicate that even with SEA LANCE escorts and 
airborne coverage from SEA ARROWs, the SEA ARCHER should have a 
terminal defense capability (soft kill and point defenses) in order to improve 
survivability, even in moderate threat environments.   
§ Fueling:  In order to maintain the level of flexibility and endurance desirable 
in the CROSSBOW force, the SEA ARCHER must be capable of refueling 
the SEA LANCE. 
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§ Mine Warfare:  An organic mine detection and avoidance system would 
facilitate quicker responses when operating in mine-danger areas. 
§ Speed:  The payoff associated with a 60-knot operational speed was not 
evident.  However, one analysis did indicate a reduction in the probability of a 
successful submarine engagement as speed increased.  Ship design trade 
studies should examine speed and the associated benefits as a function of cost 
over the range of 45 to 60 knots.   
b. The SEA ARCHER Air Wing 
§ ISR&T:  Superior scouting was so crucial to success that the mini-study teams 
recommended that a medium-endurance UAV, dedicated to Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting, be included in the air wing. 
§ Air Wing Command and Control:  Command and control of large 
UCAV/UAV strike and surveillance packages are recognized as significant 
issues.  Further research by the CROSSBOW team is recommended. 
§ SEA ARROWs and Anti-Ship Missiles (ASMs):  There was a substantial 
synergistic effect achieved when SEA ARROWs, carrying two or more 
ASMs, and SEA LANCEs were teamed against small surface combatants.  
The SEA ARROW should be designed to carrying at least two ASMs as a 
payload option. 
§ SEA ARROW in the Counter Air Role:  When configured solely for the 
counter air mission, SEA ARROW should be designed to carry three or more 
air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM or equivalent).  
§ SEA ARROW in the Air-to-Ground Role:  The strike configuration of 4 x 250 
lbs Small Smart Munitions was deemed a minimum.  The Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) mission was not directly assessed, but was 
recognized as critical for any independent operation requiring forced access. 
§ Number of SEA ARROWs:  In two independent cases, sensitivity analysis 
indicated that six SEA ARROWs per SEA ARCHER Air Wing was optimal.  
However, since very little is known regarding SEA ARROW reliability and 
maintainability, we recommended that the Air Wing have minimum of six 
operational SEA ARROWs, with two spares on board. 
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§ Helicopters:  Helicopters were only directly evaluated in one scenario (anti-
piracy), in which they played a key role.  However, their value was not 
overlooked, as they were key contributors in CROSSBOW ASW and Mine 
Warfare (MIW) capability estimates.  Also, helicopter contributions to 
logistics efforts were critical.  Additional analysis is required to determine if a 
dedicated attack helicopter is necessary and worth the additional cost, logistic 
burden, and operational complexity. 
c. SEA LANCE 
§ Speed:  The SEA LANCE must be capable of operating at speeds compatible 
with SEA ARCHER. 
§ Endurance:  The 24-hour SEA LANCE combat endurance limit created a 
logistics and operational burden during combat engagements.  Therefore, it is 
recommended that the SEA LANCE combat endurance be increased to 48-60 
hours at moderate to high transit speeds.    
§ Fueling:  In order to maintain the level of flexibility and endurance desirable 
in the CROSSBOW force, the SEA LANCE must be capable of refueling 
from the SEA ARCHER.  Therefore, SEA LANCE and SEA ARCHER 
should burn the same type of fuel. 
§ Mine Warfare:  Addition of an organic mine detection and avoidance system 
would provide greater operational flexibility in mine-danger areas. 
§ ASW Weapons:  One team recommended that some of the 51 small dual-
purpose missiles be traded for up to ten ASROC launchers. Additional 
analysis is recommended prior to making such a change. 
§ SEA LANCE II:  SEA LANCE requirements, proposed by the CROSSBOW 
team, cannot be accommodated by the existing SEA LANCE I design 
developed last year by the TSSE curriculum.31  Therefore, for the purposes of 
the CROSSBOW project, a notional SEA LANCE II design of about 600 tons 
is favored. 
d. SEA QUIVER 
                                                            
31 See http://web.nps.navy.mil/~me/tsse/files/2000.htm for a complete report. 
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§ Number of SEA QUIVERs:  As expected, the number of SEA QUIVERs 
required varied by scenario, from one to four. 
§ Size:  From the vulnerability perspective, the SEA QUIVER logistical support 
vessel should resemble the SEA ARCHER in size and speed.  Unfortunately, 
high-speed hull designs tend to be weight-limited rather than volume-limited.  
We found it impossible to design a bulk carrier that could achieve a sustained 
60 knot speed.  Therefore, we cannot analytically support the assumption of 
an operationally compatible SEA QUIVER.  This conclusion, coupled with 
project time constraints, led the team to conclude that the SEA QUIVER 
design should be left to future efforts.  For the purposes of the CROSSBOW 
project, we assumed SEA QUIVER to be equivalent in capacity to 50 percent 
of an AOE-6 class supply ship (26,000 tons) with a speed of 35-40 knots.  
§ Alternatives:  Any SEA QUIVER alternative must consider the nature of 
distributed systems.  The alternative of distributing the SEA LANCE II 
fueling task amongst the eight SEA ARCHERs certainly lessens the challenge 
of keeping the force fueled, but it does not solve the larger logistics problem.  
Unfortunately, further investigation is beyond the scope of the CROSSBOW 
project. 
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III.  FINAL CROSSBOW CONFIGURATION & CAPABILITIES 
A. SUMMARY OF SEA ARCHER CAPABILITIES & CHARACTERISTICS32 
SEA ARCHER, the ship design component of the CROSSBOW project, was 
designed and developed by students in the Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) 
curriculum.33  This, their 2001 capstone design project, was the tenth since the 
program’s inception and the first to be developed in a broader, campus-wide 
collaborative environment.34  The project grew out of a Naval War College initiative to 
explore a concept called CORSAIR, a small aviation-capable ship carrying Short-Take-
Off and Landing (STOL) Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) for littoral operations.  CORSAIR 
was envisioned as contributing to the Navy’s capability to defeat an adversary’s access-
denial strategy by providing air cover for small littoral combatants, such as the SEA 
LANCE.35 
Emergence of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat Air 
Vehicles (UCAVs), continued U.S. Navy focus on the littorals, desirability of force 
distribution, need for operational cost reduction, and the advent of Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) all point toward re-evaluation of the conduct of future littoral aviation 
operations.  These considerations also highlight the advantages of distributed air 
operations conducted from smaller ships; however, there are currently no systems in the 
U.S. Navy that can provide this capability.  Given this background, our bottom-up design 
                                                            
32 A complete report on the SEA ARCHER design can be found in Volume II. 
33 The program includes students enrolled in three NPS curricula: Mechanical Engineering, Electrical 
and Computer Engineering, and Combat Systems.  The faculty ensure that all design projects provide an 
opportunity for students from each of these curricula to apply what they have learned in their individual 
domains while participating in a wider-scope team design. 
34 A major purpose of the TSSE capstone design project is to give experience in the design process as 
applied to a large, complex-system Navy ship as the focus.  An additional major goal is for the students to 
develop and exercise the leadership and cooperative skills needed to perform a complex design as a team.  
The design produced should be interesting and innovative, and it should spur discussion and thought in 
both Navy and industry circles. 
35 SEA LANCE was the subject of the 2000 TSSE capstone project, and was done in response to a 
Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) initiative, “STREETFIGHTER.”  
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of SEA ARCHER supporting a primarily UAV/UCAV air wing in a moderate threat 
environment is a first attempt to address these needs. 
SEA ARCHER also can work effectively with (or within) CVBGs.  Saturation attacks 
have long been recognized as one of the most serious emerging threats to naval battle 
groups.  The worldwide inventory of anti-ship missiles is expected to grow in both 
number and sophistication in the coming years as costs go down and technology 
proliferates.  These missiles can be launched from ships, aircraft, and land (from fixed 
sites or mobile platforms).  By proceeding into the littoral waters ahead of the CVBGs, 
SEA ARCHER can provide formidable defense suppression.  Moreover, equipped with 
suitable electronic devices, the CROSSBOW force can greatly increase the enemy's 
targeting problem by proliferating both real and false targets, thereby drawing down the 
number of enemy anti-ship missiles in the early stages of the conflict.  Thus, initially the 
CVBG can stand off, taking full advantage of its range and firepower, as well as 
benefiting from the increased defensive battle-space.  
The operational requirements for the SEA ARCHER design included an air wing 
(eight UCAVs, eight UAVs and two helicopters), a deployment range of 4000 nm at 50 
knots, and a maximum speed of 60 knots.  We also set a manning level of not more than 
150 personnel. 
The air cushion design selected to meet these requirements displaces 13,500 
measurement tons with a length of 181 meters and beam of 59 meters. Installed 
horsepower of the gas turbines is 327,000, more than a nuclear aircraft carrier.  SEA 
ARCHER meets the demanding speed requirements of the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) by merging a catamaran hull with a surface effect ship’s air cavities.   
When filled with air by high-volume compressors, the cavities in each hull support up 
to 85 percent of the ship’s weight, cutting the ship’s draft in half and greatly reducing 
underwater resistance.  The ship is propelled by a combination of six gas turbine engines 
driving six hydro-air drive propulsors.  These vectored-thrust propulsors give the ship the 
ability to get underway without tugboats.  The propulsion plant can be operated in 
various lineups to achieve a top speed of over 60 knots without sacrificing fuel efficiency 
at lower speeds. 
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Significant manning reductions were achieved with an unmanned flight deck and 
a computer-controlled, automated hangar deck.  The fully enclosed hangar bay provides 
storage for all aircraft, maintenance areas, and a pit stop system where refueling, 
rearming, and reconfiguring functions occur.  Other automated functions include the use 
of robotic “trackbots” and “towbots” for aircraft movement, as well as automated 
weapons handling and loading.  Aircraft are launched with an Electromagnetic Aircraft 
Launching System (EMALS) catapult or can be launched without catapult assistance 
when SEA ARCHER’s speed is used to create a wind over deck greater than 40 knots.  
Fully enclosed elevators allow for corrosion-control water wash and CBR 
decontamination of aircraft in the elevator. 
Reductions in manning were also achieved through a high degree of automation in 
other functions, including damage control.  Also, a significant portion of SEA ARCHER 
maintenance is designed to be performed by outside activities.  We estimate total 
manning  of the SEA ARCHER to 128 officers and sailors.   
SEA ARCHER has an inner-layer defense provided by a free-electron laser 
(primary air defense) and stabilized small-caliber gun system (primary surface role) with 
enclosed decoy launchers.  Medium-layer defense employs air/surface capable missiles.  
This is supported by a new, small, unmanned surface craft capable of air and surface 
engagement as well as forward mine detection.  SEA ARROW, helicopters, and SEA 
LANCE provide outer-layer defenses.  Sensor suites include 3D volume-search radar, 
multi-function radar, Infra-Red Search & Track, and electro-optical systems.  Command 
and control is supported by an enhanced Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 
integrated with a ship self-defense system for air, surface and subsurface warfare. 
It was clear from the beginning that the 60kt maximum speed capability for SEA 
ARCHER would be a major design driver.  Further, it quickly became evident that 60 
knots could not be sustained for extended periods due to fuel consumption.  However, the 
advantage in maneuver warfare provided by a limited-duration sprint capability was 
deemed important enough to keep 60 knots as the top speed requirement.  This led to the 
choice of the HARLEY SES hull form over the other alternatives seriously considered 
(high-speed catamaran and pentamaran).  The results of the design process also 
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highlighted the significant penalty that must be paid for such speed.  The propulsion 
system required to propel the nominal 15,000 LT SEA ARCHER at 60 knots is larger 
than the propulsion system required to propel a nominal 100,000 LT aircraft carrier at 35 
knots, with a corresponding need for fuel tanks disproportionate to the size of a 15,000 
LT conventional ship.  Therefore, the 60-kt capability does not, in retrospect, seem worth 
the design trades it necessitated.  That design specification is, at minimum, a question for 
further analysis. 
Because the SEA ARROW UCAV had the ability to take off (with a 40-kt wind 
over deck) in 400 ft, we provided that takeoff length on the flight deck so that UCAV 
operation would not be dependent on launcher availability.  Also, the only resistance and 
powering data available to the team for this hull type was based on specific combinations 
of naval architectural characteristics, such as length-to-beam ratio.  In order to enhance 
the validity of the major “scaling up” required for the hull, the same ship geometry was 
maintained, and this, coupled with the 400-ft takeoff length, resulted in a ship that has 
excess volume for its payload.36  
While payload weight was not a major factor in the design, the fuel load required 
to meet the deployment profile (to include refueling escorts) was a major weight 
challenge.  Because of this, the ship is weight- (not volume-) limited, and further design 
integration can be expected to reduce the excess volume in the ship. 
SEA ARCHER, as designed, would be part of a layered engagement concept for 
both strike and defense.  That layered concept would utilize technology currently being 
developed for the Navy.  However, some systems specific to SEA ARCHER’s ORDs are 
also proposed.37 
From the tables below, it is evident that SEA ARCHER would be heavily 
dependent on defense systems aboard SEA LANCE II since SEA ARCHER’s combat 
systems would provide self-protection only to 30km.38 This concept is workable only if 
                                                            
36 The payload associated with eight UCAVs, ten notional UAVs and two helicopters is relatively 
small. 
37 See Appendix H and Volume V for details. 
38 This notional ship design is different from the original SEA LANCE in that it would match the 
speed and endurance of SEA ARCHER.  It would also have a larger complement of missiles to provide a 
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SEA ARCHER units can take full advantage of distributed operations while having the 
ability to share information seamlessly.  That would increase the coverage of the 
taskforce (operating as a fully cooperative whole), enhancing combat effectiveness and 
increasing survivability.  
 Range SEA LANCE II SEA ARCHER 
Outer Layer 200 km  SEA ARROW 






Sparrow Missile / 
USC Missiles 
Close-In 5 km RAM 
RAM now 
FEL later 
      Table 3.  Layered Strike and Air Defense Concept for CROSSBOW Taskforce 
 
 
 Range SEA LANCE II  SEA ARCHER 
Outer Layer >200 km  SEA ARROW 
Middle-Layer >50 km Harpoon / Medium Range Missile  
Inner-Layer 30km Super SEA Sparrow Missile 
Super SEA 
Sparrow Missile / 
SEA ARCHER’s 
Unmanned Surface 
Craft Missiles / 
Helo Missiles 
Close-In 5 km Small Caliber Gun System  
Free Electron Laser 
/ Small Caliber 
Gun System 





                                                                                                                                                                                 
higher capability in both self and task force protection, coupled with sensor suites to match the missile and 
threat environment.  As a result, it would have about 50 percent more displacement (approximately 700 








 Range SEA LANCE II SEA ARCHER 
Middle-Layer 
Defense >50 km  Helicopters 
Inner-Layer Defense 15km Torpedoes, ASROC  
                 Table 5.   Layered Sub-Surface Defense for CROSSBOW Taskforce 
 
B. CROSSBOW AIR WING CAPABILITIES & CHARACTERISTICS  
 
1. Background 
The CROSSBOW air wing, embarked on 8 SEA ARCHER UAV Tactical 
Support Ships, is comprised of 8 multi-mission SEA ARROW, Unmanned Combat Air 
Vehicles (UCAVs), 8 multi-mission support UAVs, and 2 MH-60 multi-mission 
helicopters for each SEA ARCHER.  CROSSBOW mission analysis, campaign analysis, 
distributed force C4I requirements, operating envelope and environment, and vehicle 
parametric constraints contributed to platform selection.  Figure 3 shows the aircraft that 
comprise the SEA ARCHER air wing. 
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SEA ARROW (8)
SUPPORT UAVs (8) MH-60s (2)
 
Figure 3.  SEA ARCHER Air Wing Aircraft 
 
 
2. SEA ARROW39 
SEA ARROW Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV), a product of the NPS 
Aeronautics and Astronautics Department’s Capstone Aircraft Design course, is a highly 
maneuverable aircraft designed for Armed Reconnaissance and Battlefield Interdiction.  
Figure 4 presents four views of the SEA ARROW. 
                                                            
39 All specifics on the SEA ARROW design are products of the NPS Aeronautics and Astronautics 




Figure 4.  Four Views of the SEA ARROW 
A detailed analysis using Quality Functional Deployment was used to determine the 
critical design parameters.  Based on the design requirements, the most critical factors 
were found to be takeoff distance, endurance, payload weight, and size.  To this effect, 
the use of composites, Life Cycle Costs (LCC), Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), 
and Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) all played crucial roles finding a design that was 
relatively low-cost, easy to maintain, and, for the most part, expendable. 
Four conceptual configurations were analyzed, with detailed weight and drag 
analysis results the study's main focus.  The final design configuration was a 14,400 lb 
aircraft with an Aspect Ratio of 5.83 and a wingspan of 38.9 feet.  In addition to the 
rough order of magnitude QFD studies, a model for cost (Eddins Cost Model) was 
developed and a Taguchi cost analysis completed. 
Conceptual design was followed by a preliminary look into the major aspects of 
design, including airfoil design, structural analysis, engine design, Taguchi weight 
studies, studies of stability and control, survivability, risk analysis, maintainability, and 
measures of effectiveness.  Finally, a general study of avionics and payload 
advancements was made to conclude this first design iteration of SEA ARROW 





Parameter RFP Value SEA ARROW Value 
Maximum Flyaway Cost $ 8M (2001$)  $ 9.5M (2001$) 
Operational Life 50 Missions 50 Missions 
Weapons Payload 2000 lbs  1500 lbs 
Range (1) 200 NM  930 NM(4), 1603 NM(5) 
Endurance 6 hours on station 7.8 Hours 
Instantaneous Turn 28 degrees/sec @ Sea Level 28 deg/sec 
Sustained Turn 25 degrees/sec @ Sea Level 25 deg/sec 
Alternative Missions CAS, CAP, SEAD Yes 
Acceleration (2) 0.4M to 0.8M ≤ 40 seconds  Yes 
Takeoff, Conventional 400 feet 387 feet 
Takeoff, Catapult-
Assisted 
≤ 200 feet < 200 feet 
Signature Low RCS/IR Signature 4.9 m2/IR TBD 
Specific Excess Power (3) + 250 fps  > 300 (Clean) 
Propulsion COTS (Commercial Off-the-Shelf) AE-3007 Variant 
Deployment Envelope 4 shipped per C-17 Not Determined 
Storage 20 years, (Near FMC) Not Determined 
Manning Uninhabited Vehicle Yes 
1) Cruise Mach >0.8 at 30K ft; 2) At 5K feet; 3)At 5K feet (M>0.4); 4) 
FullOrdinance Load; 5) No Ordinance Load 
Table 6.  Compliance Matrix for Aircraft 
 
3. Payloads and Missions Summary 
Although designed for the armed reconnaissance and battlefield interdiction missions, the 
SEA ARROW can fill many other roles.  SEA ARROW is expected to perform 
Suppresion of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), and 
specialized Mine Countermeasure (MCM)40 missions.  It is important to note that the 
SEA ARROW also has a limited ISR&T capability for operations independent of the 
Support UAV. The modular payloads41 envisioned are:  
                                                            
40 See CROSSBOW Specialized Supporting Study; “CROSSBOW Mine Countermeasures And 
Terminal Defense Weapons, by Major Lawrence Lim, SAF, Volume V of this report. 
41 At max fuel load (4300lbs) only 1500lbs of ordnance can be carried; however, at 50% fuel, range 
still exceeds 400nm and payload can be increased to 3550lbs.  Only the 1st three payloads listed were 
investigated by the Aero design team, the remainder, are payloads SEA ARROW should be able to carry 
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■       4 x 250lb Small Smart Bombs 
■       2 x AMRAAM AIM120 (350lbs ea.) 
■       1 x Gun Pod – GPU-2A (M197) (600 lbs) 
■       2 x HARM (Inboard ~1000lbs ea.)  
■       3 x Jammer pods - new design (Current ALQ-99 ~1000lbs ea.) 
■       3 x Anti-Ship Missiles (ASM) Current Air Launched Harpoon   
          Inboard~1000lbs ea. 
■       Combinations of three variants of air launched MCM ROVs ~ 500lbs each 
■       Hunter / Processor / Neutralizer 
■       Helicopter or ship recovery 
■       Laser Mine Hunting Module (<2500 lbs) 
 
4.       Multi-mission Support UAV 
Figure 5 shows a Multi-mission Support UAV. 
 
Figure 5.   Multi-mission Support UAV 
 
The Multi-mission support UAV was not designed as part of the CROSSBOW project.  
However, a Specialized Support Study, “Requirements Analysis for an Airborne 
Communications Node (ACN),”42 was completed. The resulting notional CROSSBOW 
UAV was designed to carry the ACN, Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance and 
Targeting (ISR&T) package, or the Airborne Early Warning modular payload.  The 
design constraints were based on the maximum payload and operational requirements of 
the three main missions.  The CROSSBOW ACN dictated the requirements for maximum 
payload weight, altitude and endurance and the AEW payload set the maximum power 
requirements.  The CROSSBOW ACN requirements are: 
§ 12-hour endurance  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
based on its basic performance characteristics. 
42SSS by Major Khee Loon Foo (SAF), Volume V.  See also Appendix E . 
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§ Eight hours on station time 
§ Four hours transit 
§ Payload of up to 500 lbs 
§ Launch and recovery from SEA ARCHER 
The resulting UAV has a gross weight of about 8300 lbs and a wingspan of about 72 ft.   
The Airborne Communications Node is a simple hub in the sky providing theater-
wide connectivity to all CROSSBOW forces.  Such an airborne node will circumvent 
most line-of-sight problems and provide an organic asset, which will reduce 
CROSSBOW dependency on Military Satellite Communications and the associated 
bandwidth congestion problems.  The airborne communications package weighs about 
500lbs.  This payload can provide a communications relay for VHF, UHF and SHF.  As a 
satellite gateway, the ACN also provides communications beyond line-of-sight to forces 
outside the CROSSBOW operational envelope.  This requires four ACNs flying at 
20,000ft launched from SEA ARCHERS.  This provides operational coverage over 
300nm to all CROSSBOW forces, which include: 64 SEA ARROW UCAVs, 64 Multi-
mission UAVs, 20 SEA LANCE II small combatants and the SEA QUIVER Logistics 
elements.   
For the ISR&T mission, the UAV carries a multi-sensor payload that consists of 
three types of sensors and a Common Data Link.  These include an integrated MTI/SAR 
to take high-resolution pictures and detect moving targets, an EO/IR sensor with laser 
range designation capability, an Electronic Support Measures payload to detect enemy 
radar emissions, and a Common Data Link to send near-real-time intelligence back to the 
ground control station.  This combination of active and passive sensors can make the 
UAV less vulnerable to enemy detection.  In an effort to control cost and maintain 
combat consumability commensurate with the CROSSBOW concept, the payload was 
designed to achieve a proper balance between cost and performance.  The performance of 
these sensors was based on current sensor technology.  With an inventory of 64 UAVs, 
the synergistic effects of larger numbers and distribution can compensate for the 
relatively austere performance of the sensors and can allow CROSSBOW to conduct 
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multiple ISRT missions simultaneously, thus increasing the responsiveness and 
operational effectiveness of CROSSBOW.  
It is recognized that an airborne early warning (AEW) capability is required for 
CROSSBOW, but time constraints made a detailed investigation impossible.  However, a 
quick-look analysis conducted as part of the “CROSSBOW Air Defense Suite” 
Specialized Supporting Study43 determined that, with surveillance and detection ranges 
of 50 nm, it is technically feasible to put an AEW payload on the envisioned Multi-
mission Support UAV.   
 5. Multi-mission Helicopter MH-60  
The U.S. Navy is in the process of moving most helicopter missions to the MH-
60.  Two variants are being fielded, and both can do the armed helicopter missions.  For 
the purposes of the CROSSBOW project, the following missions are envisioned for the 
MH-60: 
§ Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD) 
§ Combat Search And Rescue (CSAR) 
§ Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) 
§ Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) 
§ Anti-surface Warfare (ASUW) 
The MH-60 was an obvious choice for CROSSBOW, and since it is a well-
understood platform, details of its capabilities will not be repeated here.  It should also be 
noted that no analysis was done as part of this study to determine the appropriate mix of 
MH-60S and MH-60R airframes.  We assumed that eight of each type would be 
distributed across the eight SEA ARCHERs.  
C. SUMMARY OF SEA LANCE II CAPABILITIES & CHARACTERISTICS  
1.  Background 
SEA LANCE II is a notional construct based on the NPS Total Ship System 
Engineering Group’s SEA LANCE I design, shown in Figure 6.  This ship, designed as a 
                                                            
43 SSS by CPT Sng Chun Hock, SAF.  See Appendix H and volume V. 
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small, diesel-powered inshore combatant, came closer to meeting the CROSSBOW 


















Figure 6.  SEA LANCE 
   
However, CROSSBOW speed and endurance requirements precluded using the original 
SEA LANCE design. Initially the SEA LANCE system was designed to tow a module for 
the deployment of an Expeditionary Warfare sensor grid.  The speed requirement of the 
CROSSBOW system made transportation of the grid module impractical.  We modified 
SEA LANCE parametrically for the CROSSBOW application.  SEA LANCE II is larger 
than the original SEA LANCE design, with substantially greater fuel storage and 
propulsion power.  We replaced the original SEA LANCE diesel power plant with a gas 
turbine system as probably the most economical solution to the speed requirements that 
would also provide for logistic compatibility with the other units of the CROSSBOW 
force. 
2.     SEA LANCE II Requirements 
SEA LANCE II requirements are as follows: 
§ Speed:  The SEA LANCE II must be capable of operating at speeds 
commensurate with SEA ARCHER (Threshold: 40-knots transit, 50-knots 
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dash.  We note that since SEA LANCE does not have to launch aircraft, its 
tactical dash speed is less than that of SEASEA ARCHER.). 
§ Endurance: The initial 24-hour SEA LANCE I combat endurance limit created 
a logistical and operational burden, noted during Campaign Analysis combat 
engagements.  SEA LANCE II combat endurance should be 48-60 hours.    
§ Fueling:  In order to maintain the level of flexibility and endurance desirable 
in the CROSSBOW force, the SEA LANCE II must be capable of refueling 
from SEA ARCHER. 
§ Mine Warfare (MIW):  A more robust organic mine detection and avoidance 
system is essential when operating in mine danger areas.  Two MIW 
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) are included on SEA LANCE II.44 
§ Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Weapons:  Without the Sensor Grid, SEA 
LANCE lacks an offensive ASW capability.  Therefore, SEA LANCE II 
incorporates the Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC) system or circa 2020 
equivalent.  An analysis should be done to determine the appropriate number 
of launchers, keeping in mind the distributed nature of the CROSSBOW 
system. 
For compactness, the original SEA LANCE design is not summarized here.  For 
ease of reference, the entire NPS SEA LANCE report45 has been reproduced in Volume 
V.  
3.  Summary of SEA LANCE II 
SEA LANCE II is a minimally manned, compact warship designed for maximum 
flexibility, while providing as much comfort as possible for its highly trained crew.  The 
operations of the entire ship are controlled from a central control station located on the 
bridge. There are numerous reasons to locate the crew centrally.  Locating crew members' 
berthing spaces close to their work provides for quick access to battle and watch stations 
                                                            
44 See “CROSSBOW Mine Countermeasures and Terminal Defense Weapons,” A CROSSBOW 
Specialized Supporting Study by Major Lawrence Lim.  (Vol. I, Section III – Executive Summary / Vol. V. 
Complete Study). 
45 See “Sea Lance” Littoral Warfare Combatant System. Technical Report. Naval Postgraduate 
School. NPS-ME-01-001. 
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and also limits the amount of CBR protection space.  Locating all living accommodations 
centrally allowed the design team to produce an environment that affords the crew some 
amenities not normally present on a small combatant, while also maintaining an austere 
space footprint.  The spacious gym and galley areas give the crew ample space to relax 
and unwind.  The habitable space is also designed to accommodate ship riders, such as 
Fly Away Teams (FATs) for repairs to SEA LANCE II, as well as SEAL teams or an 
intelligence detachment.  The multi-mission space located in the habitable space could be 
used for any special equipment or compartmentalization required.  A schematic of the 
combatant spaces is presented in Figure 7. 
The ship is designed to withstand only moderate damage, but provides an 
opportunity for the crew to leave the ship rapidly in the event of heavy damage from 
attack.  Two life rafts, located port and starboard in the central control station, can 
accommodate 25 people each.  The Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB), located just aft of 
the habitable spaces on the starboard side, can be accessed directly from the berthing 
passageway.  The RHIB can accommodate all 21 crew members.  
The combatant is designed with a robust combat suite to ensure protection for the 
craft while operating independently.  It has four Harpoon/SLAM tubes along the port 
side, two 30mm guns located fore and aft, and a 51-cell vertical RF/IR guided missile 
launcher aft.  The ship could also perform maritime interdiction (MIO), non-combatant 
evacuation (NEO), and escort for the CVBGs or (ARGs).  It is well suited for combat 
against the wide range of small surface combatants found in international navies.  The 
sensors suite is capable of operating in a wide range of environments.  The air/surface 
search radar has a range of 54 Nm, while both the infrared search and track and the fire 
control radar have a range of 20 Nm.  The electro-optical suite has a range of ten nm, and 
the mine-avoidance sonar has a detection range of approximately 350 yards.  
Additionally, the ship is equipped with an ESM suite and phased array communications 
antennas.  The entire suite is enhanced by the use of an advanced enclosed mast.  
Reduction in Radar Cross Section (RCS) is achieved by retracting the mast to a 35-foot 
height of eye.  This position would be used when operating in a high state of emissions 
control.  The mast can be extended 13 feet to a height of eye of 48 feet, thus increasing 
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the IRST detection range to 20 Nm.  The mast also has nine phased array antennas (three 
per face) located around the mast to support the range of communications requirements 




Figure 7. Schematic of the Combatant Spaces 
 
D. SUMMARY OF LOGISTICS FINDINGS 
 
1. Introduction and Purpose 
The logistic infrastructure of CROSSBOW has been identified as one of the key 
factors that will affect the design and performance of a distributed fleet.  We strove to 
identify potential technologies and concepts that could be incorporated into the 
CROSSBOW system with the aim of reducing the size of the onboard logistics structure 
and enhancing the support of the system.46  
                                                            
46 Note that this is a purely conceptual study that is written to serve as the basic framework to support 
subsequent studies.  The study is a combined thesis effort by four Systems Management Officers at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. In addition to their own curriculum, they participated in many joint courses 
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The study incorporates these identified technologies into CROSSBOW with the 
following objectives: 
§ Increasing operational availability; 
§ Reducing Total Ownership Costs (TOC); 
§ Improving operator and equipment safety. 
2. Methodology/Approach 
The approach was to review current logistic practices and procedures to identify 
potential areas for improvement.  Research, interviews, and site visits were then 
conducted to identify potential technologies and concepts that could be used to address 
the areas identified.  Subsequently, a framework was devised to functionally integrate the 
selected technologies, techniques, and methodologies into a feasible architecture.  The 
proposed framework was then validated using software simulation tools and life cycle 
cost analyses. 
3. Results: The Selected Technologies  
The identified technologies and concepts are: 
§ Autonomic Systems: Autonomic systems take advantage of advances in 
information and systems integration technologies to provide accurate and 
timely information directly from the weapon systems to the battle-space 
managers.  When integrated with Prognostic Health Monitoring System 
(PMHS), the system will be capable of processing weapon system degradation 
information and will take the necessary steps to expedite replacement and 
repair of components. 
■  Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM): CBM exploits advances in sensor 
technology to accurately detect current system condition and forecast the 
remaining life of systems and equipment.  CBM focuses on doing 
maintenance only when required, eliminating unnecessary and costly periodic 
maintenance. 
 52 
■  Serial Number Tracking (SNT):  SNT is a management system that enables 
accurate and reliable tracking of individual in-transit components, usage data, 
configuration management, and component failure.  SNT leverages Automatic 
Identification Technology (AIT) to allow maintenance, warranty and other 
data to be stored within the system or component itself, easing the 
configuration management process.  
■   Distributed Networks and Intelligent Agents: This exploits advances in 
computing and artificial intelligence to allow decision making and technical 
repairs to be performed at a lower level, increasing the operational availability 
of systems and shortening the mean time to restore the capability of a disabled 
system.  Intelligent agents also facilitate improved forecasting and trend 
analysis capabilities.   
■   Single Definition Engineering (SDE): SDE is a control management technique 
that uses common (open) architectures of specific weapon systems and 
associated software, thus reducing sparing requirements and life cycle costs.  
■    Life-time Partnering of Weapon Systems Contractors: Life-time partnering is 
the negotiation of symbiotic relationships with contractors to provide more 
efficient support throughout the life of the system. 
■   Modular Weapon System Design:  Modular designs provide easier installation 
and maintenance, with commensurate Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) 
reductions. 
■  Tele-Maintenance: Tele-Maintenance makes use of advances in communication 
and information technology to enable remote interface with engineering and 
maintenance expertise to assist in maintenance processes. 
■  Other Innovations: These include labor-saving innovations such as paint-less 
technologies and robotics. These technologies will be incorporated into a 
proposed logistic framework with the following five main modules: 1)  
Logistics;  2) Maintenance; 3) Personnel; 4) Training; and 5) 
Vendor/Contractor.  These five modules operate within a Command, Control, 
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Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) information systems 
architecture.  The Total Asset Visibility (TAV) database provides 
comprehensive information on all aspects of the battle-space, including 
weapon system status, personnel status/end strength, situational and casualty 
reporting, and operational forecasting.  The C4I system will also house a 
Decision Support System with links to design reference missions. The 
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Figure 8. Crossbow Logistics Framework 
 
The various aspects of each of the five main modules are described below. 
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■   Logistics:  Enhanced configuration management through TAV; manpower and 
resource reductions through the use of autonomic systems; proactive 
determination of logistic requirements based upon usage trends and stockroom 
availability; and improved forecasting tools to improve logistic management 
and provide faster response to the war fighter’s requirements.  
■    Autonomic Maintenance Module:  Internal prognostic/diagnostic capabilities 
within weapon systems to facilitate the maintenance procedure; enhanced 
forecasting and planning capability for scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance activities; online tele-maintenance and virtual technical manuals 
for improved technical support; recommendations for repair actions when 
Ready For Installation (RFI) components are not available; and embedded 
links to vendor/contracted engineering services for support.  
■   Personnel & Training Module: Automated records maintenance and upkeep,  
including medical, dental, service record, training, pay and promotion 
documentation; online/interactive training, including virtual rehearsal of 
maintenance procedures.  
■   Vendor Contractor: Real-time links to Prime Contractor to facilitate 
engineering and technical support. 
■   C4I Systems:
47
 The overarching system that links all modules to provide real-
time data, anticipatory metrics and a decision support system (with suggested 
remedies). 
The eight selected merging technologies, as presented above and detailed in 
Volume 5, are critical for reducing manpower requirements, enhancing training, 
increasing asset visibility, reducing maintenance requirements, decreasing repair cycle 
time, and increasing operational availability of CROSSBOW.  If implemented, they will 
translate into effective and affordable sustainment of the total weapon system.  The 
                                                            
47 Please refer to “Logistics and Maintenance Concepts for a Future Naval Force”—by William W. 
Edge, Joe F. Ray, Gerald P. Raia, and Kenneth J. Brown, Combined Thesis, 2001 Naval Postgraduate 
School – for an example scenario of how these modules work in tandem. This report may be found in 
Volume IV. 
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CROSSBOW sustainment concept provides a general example of an integrated 
framework with new technologies and methodologies that are obtainable.  The reduced 
training requirement and lower operating hours of unmanned aircraft promise substantial 
savings in aviation operations such as envisioned for CROSSBOW.   
The Navy should not assume that current technologies and methodologies will 
adequately support the accelerated battlefield tempo and autonomous operations expected 
in the year 2020 for systems such as CROSSBOW.  Given this premise, effort should be 
expended now to conduct analysis, within a Systems Architecture/Engineering 
methodology, to adapt and integrate new technologies and methodologies to meet the 
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IV.     CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The CROSSBOW project has given students a rare opportunity to coordinate 
requirements, conduct tradeoff studies, and function as an integrated and interdisciplinary 
team.  The experience, unique to NPS, has helped students understand the complexities 
associated with the transformation of technology into a viable future naval force.  It also 
has taught them how to work in interdisciplinary teams to deal with those complexities.  
This project report is not an authoritative handbook for designing and constructing a 
distributed force like CROSSBOW.  It aims, rather, to highlight the basic concept and 
what it takes to progress from concept to operational forces. The bottom line is that, 
although the depth of the study we could undertake does not allow for wholesale 
endorsement, further investigation definitely is warranted. 
A. WHAT WE LEARNED WHILE DEFINING THE CROSSBOW FORCE 
§ No CROSSBOW force we could conceive is a useful replacement for current 
aircraft carriers or Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs).  CROSSBOW brings only 
limited capabilities to blue-water and high-threat areas of operation. 
§ CROSSBOW can, however, effectively supplement CVBGs in the littorals, 
providing Theater Commanders with more coverage in low- to medium-threat 
areas of national interest. 
§ CROSSBOW can also complement existing U.S. naval forces in high-threat 
regions, adding robustness and distribution that significantly complicate  
enemy responses. 
§ Any force of small, littoral combatants, such as CROSSBOW, must have 
organic air cover and a viable scouting capability in order to fight effectively 
and survive. 
B. WHAT WE CONCLUDED AFTER DEFINING THE FORCE 
§ The 60-knot objective imposed on the SEA ARCHER has serious implications 
for ship design and cost, without commensurate tactical benefit. 
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§ A ship dedicated to UAV operational experimentation would aid in and 
accelerate development of the technology, tactics and procedures necessary to 
operate large numbers of sea-based UAVs simultaneously. 
§ Support of the CROSSBOW force requires enhancements to the existing 
logistics infrastructure. 
§ Any distributed force operating independently requires an organic 
communications relay capability to augment and back up satellite 
communications. 
§ High speed, reduced displacement, relatively quiet hull designs, and force 
distribution significantly reduce CROSSBOW vulnerability to submarine 
attack.  Moreover, a high-speed unmanned airborne ASW barrier, patrolling 
ahead of the CROSSBOW force, is conceptually feasible and warrants further 
exploration. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This study is not intended to be a “how-to” manual on the construction or 
configuration of a distributed force.  It does, however, provide a basic framework from 
which to explore and develop the concept further.  In particular, CROSSBOW project 
results strongly suggest the following areas for further study: 
§ The C4ISR requirement for a distributed force such as CROSSBOW is 
complex.  Due to time and manpower limitations, the study did not cover the 
subject completely. 
§ Robust and extensive automation is required to achieve significant manning 
reductions while maintaining combat effectiveness.  This implies up-front 
investment, including funding development of relevant technologies and full-
scale concept definition studies. 
§ The SEA ARCHER design shows great promise and warrants further 
iterations, with emphasis on the following: reduced speed requirement, with 
an examination of the design trade space associated with a 40-50 knot 
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maximum speed; Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV); further definition 
of subsystems associated high-speed flight deck operations, building on 
design work already accomplished; and further exploration of close-in defense 
configuration, especially the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) launchers.  
Further iteration of the SEA LANCE II design is also warranted to optimize 
RAM launcher configuration; provide for launch and recovery of Uninhabited 
Undersea Vehicles (UUVs); and incorporate Anti-Submarine Rocket 
capability.  
§ A more detailed analysis is needed for CROSSBOW air defense, with an 
emphasis on the technology needed to provide for airborne early warning. 
§ A second iteration of the Logistic Framework concept is clearly in order and 
should be closely integrated with the platform and weapons design efforts.  
Also, there is a need to investigate the desirability and feasibility of a high-
speed logistic supply ship―recognizing the danger of its becoming a lucrative 
target. 
§ A deeper study of the Network Centric Warfare concept for CROSSBOW is 
needed, with a view to integration within a distributed fleet.  Some of the 
Specialized Supporting Studies from Volume V of this report could help 
support such an effort.48  Further study of exploiting knowledge processes 
and artificial intelligence technologies to enhance the information superiority 
of distributed forces is also needed.  Similarly, there is a need to investigate 
the complex mission planning capability required for multiple simultaneous 
UAV missions launched from distributed platforms. 
§ While the CROSSBOW force proposed here is the product of serious analysis 
and careful deliberation, operational studies to further refine the concept are 
warranted.  In particular, such studies should address the inherent ability of a 
CROSSBOW force to change in both scale and composition.  They should 
                                                            
48 In particular, the following studies seem useful: Requirement Analysis for Airborne 
Communications Nodes, Communications Requirements for CROSSBOW’s UAV, and An Analysis of Multi 
Sensor Payloads for CROSSBOW UAV. 
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also investigate CROSSBOW operations with combatants of the original SEA 
LANCE design (SEA LANCE I with the Expeditionary Warfare Grid). 
§ Operational analyses should further address CROSSBOW operations in 
conjunction with CVBGs.  In particular, they should explore migration of 
MH-60s and other support aircraft to SEA ARCHER in order to free carrier 
deck space for strike assets. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Much of the technology needed to make CROSSBOW an operational reality must 
be developed.  This is true of the operational concepts, as well.  However, we assess that 
most of the technology and all of the operational concepts could be developed by 2012, 
which could, in turn, lead to an operational deployment of CROSSBOW by 2020. The 
following are promising areas for technical and operational development: 
§ Free Electron Lasers show promise for close-in ship defense.  This is true for 
CROSSBOW, as well as for other naval combatants.  Development of a ship-
based Free Electron Laser should be seriously explored. 
§ Soft-kill weapons such as directed-effects ElectroMagnetic Pulse (EMP) 
warheads are a highly promising counter to missile saturation attacks.  Soft-
kill methods are especially useful for distributed forces such as CROSSBOW.  
Development of an EMP warhead for the RAM is well worth considering. 
§ The following operational experiments should be undertaken during SEA 
ARCHER development and early operational life: high-speed flight deck 
operations; operations of a CROSSBOW task force with a CVBG; operating 
CROSSBOW units fully integrated into a CVBG, especially combined 
operations with manned and unmanned combat vehicles; basing rotary-winged 
air assets on SEA ARCHER; using SEA ARCHER as a “lily pad” for 
recovery and staging STOVL strike aircraft and also as a base for those 
aircraft. 
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This is not intended to be an exhaustive statement of conclusions and 
recommendations.  Further areas of research and analysis will be identified, and these 
will lead, in turn, to new conclusions.  However, this project report provides a useful 
reference point for further study of distributed naval forces. 
It is worth restating that CROSSBOW is not, and cannot be, a substitute for 
existing carrier forces.  However, we conclude that it has promise to be practical, 
effective, and affordable.  It can fill a specific need for naval presence in low- to 
moderate-threat littoral regions, supplementing carrier battle groups.  Moreover, it brings 
robustness to the combined naval force, greatly compounding the enemy’s problem of 
area denial against U.S. naval forces, projecting power into high-threat areas.  It is also 
worth restating that limits on time and resources limited the depth of the study.   
This study does not provide sufficient depth to endorse the CROSSBOW concept 






























In order to further explore the operational and technical feasibility of the 
CROSSBOW concept, fourteen Specialized Supporting Studies (SSS) were 
conducted covering weapon systems, communications, information management, 
automation and logistics.  Each student chose their own topic related to CROSSBOW 
based on individual interests.  This division, combined with academic, time and 
resource constraints, made it impossible to cover all critical areas of CROSSBOW, 
leaving gaps in the study.  Collectively, the SSS represent a first step in the process of 
examining the key issues and technological options to realize the CROSSBOW 
concept.   There remain other critical areas that warrant further investigation.  They 
include the need to assess the technological feasibility of the physical implementation 
of Network Centric Warfare, examination of command and control difficulties 
associated with distributed forces and closer scrutiny of interoperability issues.   
Presented below are executive summaries of the fourteen SSS. Each summary serves 
to highlight its respective contribution to the CROSSBOW concept, the methodology 
employed, the key findings and proposed areas for further research.   The complete 
SSS can be found in Volume V. 
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APPENDIX A.  AN ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTED COMBAT SYSTEMS49 
1. Purpose 
This thesis analyzes the potential benefits of a distributed fleet50. 
2. Methodology/Approach 
Campaign analysis techniques and two simple combat models51 are used to 
evaluate the performance of a distributed fleet. Additionally, a simple network model is 
used to evaluate the robustness of a distributed command and control architecture.  This 
thesis also discusses what’s needed to support the distributed fleet. Qualitative 
discussions that incorporate historical lessons form the last part of the analysis. 
3. Results  
Results obtained from the quantitative analyses indicate that distribution offers the 
following advantages: 
§ Increased force effectiveness of a fleet.52 
§ Flexibility to act in more places at the same time.  
§ Increased robustness and connectivity with a distributed command and control 
architecture. 
§ Denial of enemy opportunity to concentrate its firepower. 
§ Increased robustness, in that the fleet still maintains a significant portion of its 
original capabilities even after sustaining predictable losses. 
§ Increased surveillance activities required by the enemy to detect the entire 
distributed fleet. 
                                                            
49 Based on “An Analysis of Distributed Combat Systems,” by Keith Jude Ho.  This specialized 
supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report.   
50 Distribution refers to the allocation of a fixed amount of combat potential among a variable number 
of platforms. 
51 The Lanchester Equations Model and the Naval Salvo Equations Model.  
52 In an experiment conducted, it was found that a fleet that has all of its offensive assets on board a 
few large ships is consistently outperformed by a fleet possessing the same amount of offensive assets but 
is distributed among many smaller ships.  
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§ Complication of the enemy’s information acquisition problem for targeting 
purposes.  
§ Avoidance of catastrophic losses associated with the loss of one or two high-
value ships.  
§ Denial of enemy ability to defend with a single maneuver. 
§ Increased flexibility of fleet composition. Fleet size can be easily scaled up or 
down to meet the requirements of the mission. 
§ Increased continuous pressure on the enemy as opposed to “pulsed” 
operations. 
Distribution also allows the fleet the opportunity to employ numerous small ships 
to carry its firepower. A distributed fleet is then able to exploit the advantages associated 
with the use of numerous small ships. These advantages include the following: 
§ Small ships are inherently more defendable by soft kill defenses because of 
their size. 
§ Small but powerfully armed ships are suitable for high-risk missions, 
sanitizing dangerous waters for higher-value ships. 
§ An increased number of combatants would allow for faster searches and more 
accurate situational updates.  
The benefits of distribution are substantial.  However, the logistical, 
communication, command, and control support required are significantly more complex. 
A distributed fleet’s main advantage lies in its apparent lack of a single point of failure. 
Hence, the logistical support, communications support, or any other function of the 
distributed fleet must not turn out to be a single point of failure.  Otherwise, the benefits 




APPENDIX B.  AN ESTIMATION OF CROSSBOW ACQUISITION AND   
OPERATING AND SUPPORT COSTS53 
 
1. Purpose 
This specialized support study estimates the costs to acquire, operate, and support 
the entire CROSSBOW force of 30 ships and 144 aircraft.  For a distributed concept to be 
successful, its costs per operational unit must be relatively low. 
2. Methodology/Approach 
A number of costing models were used to determine these costs. The author 
created three models to estimate: 1) total Operating and Support (O&S) costs per year by 
ship type and number of personnel embarked; 2) total acquisition cost for aircraft 
carriers; and 3) total acquisition cost for ships (other than aircraft carriers). The source 
data for these models were taken from the Visibility and Management of Operating and 
Support Cost (VAMOSC) database and the Navy Fact File (NFF). Non-linear regression 
analysis was used to estimate the cost models. 
The aeronautical design team used two established models to estimate acquisition 
and O&S costs for the SEA ARROW, with a third combination model used for 
refinement. And lastly, because the author’s model for estimating total acquisition costs 
for ships (other than aircraft carriers) yielded R-squared values less than 80 percent, an 
established NAVSEA model was used to estimate the costs of the smaller vessel, the 
SEA LANCE II.  In all cases, monetary values were adjusted to FY 2002 using 
established DoD deflators.  Learning curves were not applied to the total costs.  
Traditionally, learning in ships is quite low, and learning for UAVs has not yet been 
established, although it is likely to be similar to that of missiles. 
Based on the principle of "roughly right rather than precisely wrong," uncertainty 
is reflected only for “known unknowns.”  Statistical uncertainty is not included because 
the statistical models all had very high values of R-squared, except as noted.  Finally, 
                                                            
53  Based on “CROSSBOW Cost Estimation”, by S. Brent Carroll.  This specialized supporting study 
is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report.   
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“unknown unknowns” regarding such questions as operating hours and costs for UCAVs 
are not addressed. 
3. Results  
This analysis shows that the entire force of 30 ships and 144 aircraft will cost 
somewhere between $9.5 and $10.9 billion to acquire, and between $320 and $350 
million per year for O&S. The following is a breakdown of the costs: 
§ SEA ARCHER. The estimated acquisition cost for each SEA ARCHER is 
between $763 million and $924 million. With eight SEA ARCHERs per 
squadron, the estimated total acquisition cost is between approximately $6.1 
and $7.3 billion.  The estimated O&S cost is between $24 million and $28 
million for each ship, while the total for all eight ships is between $192 
million and $224 million.  The wide margin is caused by uncertainty of the 
cost premium for unconventional hull forms, such as a Surface Effect Ship 
(SES). 
§ SEA ARROW. The results of the aeronautical design team's models showed 
the acquisition cost to be approximately $10.5 million. The models also 
provided the breakdown in costs for O&S, which were calculated to be 12.7 
percent of LCC, or $1.8 million per aircraft for 20 years.  This is equivalent to 
approximately $88,000 per year per aircraft in present day dollars, a 
surprisingly low figure. Note that these aircraft are unmanned.  Finally, there 
are 64 SEA ARROWs embarked on CROSSBOW for a total acquisition cost 
of approximately $672 million per squadron. Also, squadron O&S cost per 
year will be approximately $5.6 million. 
§ SEA QUIVER. SEA QUIVER will cost approximately $197 million to 
acquire and $29 million a year for O&S.  Therefore, for two SEA QUIVERs, 
the total cost per CROSSBOW will be approximately $394 million for 
acquisition and approximately $58 million in O&S costs. 
§ SEA LANCE II.  The estimated acquisition cost for SEA LANCE II ranges 
from  $72 million to $80 million. O&S costs for each SEA LANCE II will be 
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approximately $1.8 million, and for the entire CROSSBOW squadron, 
approximately $36 million. The range in cost is due to uncertainty in the 
actual displacement of the ship, which is estimated to be somewhere between 
550 and 650 Long Tons (LT).Helicopters.  The acquisition cost for a SH-60F 
is approximately $23 million, and the annual O&S cost is approximately $1.7 
million.  Therefore, H-60s for the entire CROSSBOW squadron will cost 
approximately $368 million to acquire and approximately $27 million 
annually  to operate (16 aircraft). 
§ UAVs.  Notional costing for 64 CROSSBOW UAVs, using Predator data, will be 
$498 million, or $7.8 million per copy.  This cost includes acquisition and O&S.  
The total cost for the entire CROSSBOW appears to be reasonable. Although 
varying degrees of confidence were achieved with the different models, overall 
confidence is medium to low because of the immaturity of the concept.  It is important to 
emphasize that a philosophy of “roughly right rather than precisely wrong” was used to 








APPENDIX C.    AUTOMATED FLIGHT DECK AND AIRCRAFT HANDLING54 
This section examines the feasibility benefits and costs of automated aircraft and 
ordnance handling systems.  Cost estimates are in 2001 dollars. 
1.  Why an automated system? 
Today’s Nimitz class flight deck is manpower-intensive and involves many 
people working in a fast-moving, hazardous environment.  The dangers include jet blast, 
noxious gases, moving aircraft and other vehicles, jet intakes, excessive noise, bright 
lights, high winds, and temperature extremes.  The risk of accident is ever-present. 
During the last eleven years, seventy-five accidents occurred on flight decks in 
the U.S. Navy, resulting in $66,271,252 worth of equipment damage and 103 injuries.55  
While the financial cost of these injuries is unknown, the human cost is substantial.  
Ninety-three percent of these accidents were attributed to human error. 
The annual fully-burdened weighted average cost of compensation per enlisted 
person on aircraft carriers is $76,323 (2001 dollars).  If aircraft carrier manning is 
proportional to the number of sorties per day, 226 people will be required for aircraft and 
ordnance handling and launch and recovery operations, with an annual compensation cost 
of  $17.2 million. 
Both safety and cost considerations warrant exploration of a ship design with an 
unmanned flight deck.  The high ship speeds and resulting high wind over the deck 
expected on SEA ARCHER suggest that an unmanned system will be required on the 
flight deck.  Additional savings may result from automation of aircraft and ordnance 
handling. 
2.  Automated system overview 
The system envisioned for SEA ARCHER conducts all movement of aircraft, 
fueling, storage, ordnance loading, launching, recovering, and mission uploads 
automatically.  Advances in robotics, software engineering, and autonomous guided 
vehicles will make this possible.  Since CROSSBOW is new, design for automation is not 
                                                            
54 Based on “Automated Flight Deck and Aircraft Handling Feasibility” by Glen Brian Quast.  This 
specialized supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report.   
55 Navy Safety Center Aviation Database NSIRS (One-Liner) 01 Jan 1990 –24 Oct 2001 
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burdened by the need to work with legacy systems.  This system does not control the 
aircraft in flight or address command and control of the aircraft while not onboard SEA 
ARCHER. 
It is envisioned that the man/machine interface will occur when the Air Tasking 
Order (ATO) is approved.  Once the type of aircraft, mission profile, intended payload or 
ordnance, and launch and recovery time are determined, minimal human intervention will 
be required to arm, fuel, move the aircraft within the hangar, raise it to the flight deck, 
prepare for launch, connect to the catapult, and launch the aircraft.  Once the mission is 
complete, the aircraft lands on deck automatically and is moved to the hangar for 
preparation for another launch, for de-arming and preparation for storage, or for  
maintenance. 
Fixed wing and rotary wing flight operations will be conducted separately since 
fixed and rotary wing aircraft require different wind envelopes. 
The aircraft will be moved and secured on the flight deck with a system of 
“TOWBOTs” and on the hangar deck with “TRACKBOTs” and secured in place by 
“CHOCKBOTs." 
The TRACKBOTs are electric-powered, tracked vehicles that move the aircraft 
within the hangar where a system of tracks is arranged so that the UAVs and helicopters 
are moved around without interfering with other parked aircraft.  The feasibility of such a 
tracked system has been investigated using a scale model of the hangar bay, SEA 
ARROWs, and MH-60s.  The aircraft handling system occupies the full width of the 
hangar bay for 370 feet.  Figure 9 depicts the hangar bay and tracked system. 
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Figure 9.   Plan View of Hangar Deck 
 
The TOWBOTs are diesel-powered, infrared-navigated, autonomous vehicles that 
move the aircraft on the flight deck.  The flight deck layout is depicted in Figure 10.  The 
aft elevator raises the aircraft to the flight deck, where TOWBOTs move the aircraft to 
the launching area.  After landing, a TOWBOT connects to the forward landing gear and 
tows the aircraft to the forward elevator. 
The CHOCKBOTs are electric-powered, infrared-navigated, autonomous vehicles 
that secure the aircraft to the deck in the hangar bay.  The CHOCKBOTs automatically 
connect tie downs to the aircraft main landing gear and the hangar deck once the aircraft 
is in position in the hangar bay. 
4.  The cost of an automated system  
The initial development and procurement cost is estimated to at $59 million and 
the maintenance cost at $29 million.  Even allowing for a significant margin of error, this 
system is very affordable. 
This cost comparison addresses only the difference between a conventionally 
manned system and the automated system proposed.  Benefits of using an automated 
system, other than cost, will be described in the next section. 
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Figure 10.  Top View of Flight Deck Test 
 
 
5.  Advantages other than cost 
Some of the benefits of operating with an automated system, other than cost, are 
overall ship design considerations, reduction of human error, and possible Inter-
Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) reductions. 
6.  Recommendations 
The evidence strongly suggests further R&D in unmanned systems for ordnance 
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 APPENDIX D.   AUTOMATED DAMAGE CONTROL FOR REDUCED 
         MANNING FOR FUTURE SHIP DESIGNS56 
 
Future ships must be designed with a zero-manning mentality so that each person 
added must serve a purpose that automated systems cannot provide economically.  One of 
the most difficult automation tasks to envisage is Damage Control, due to its diverse 
nature, unpredictability, and the agility required for tasks such as pipe-patching, hole-
plugging, and shoring.  So, although no one envisions a completely unmanned warship, 
modern and emerging technologies may make significant manpower reductions possible. 
Since Damage Control is an important determinant of overall ship manning, this area has 
been investigated.   
By examining current technologies and making predictions based on test results 
and technology projections, future ship systems designers can perform functional 
analyses to determine the best mix of manned and unmanned systems. This section of the 
CROSSBOW project examines means by which future ship designers could greatly 
reduce manning levels by utilizing current and projected technologies to automate many 
Damage Control functions. 
Through automation, reduced manning is achievable.  Automated Damage 
Control systems can perform many of the functions currently performed by people, 
including: 1) heat stress monitoring; 2) fire detection, isolation, and suppression; 3) 
flooding detection, isolation, and dewatering; 4) electrical fault detection, isolation, and 
re-routing; 5) video surveillance; and 6) personnel accountability.  Additionally, 
automated systems could decrease the overall reaction/response times through the use of 
high-speed processing and expert systems. 
This section proposes an overarching system, the Integrated Supervisory Control 
System (ISCS), which could be developed using current technology.  If implemented 
correctly, an ISCS could drastically reduce DC manning requirements and improve 
                                                            
56 Based on   “Automating Damage Control to Reduce Manning for Future Ship Designs,” by Lance 
C. Lantier.  This specialized supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report.   
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survivability.  A major problem inhibiting the development of such a system today is lack 
of interface and protocol standardization.   
Many different elements within the Navy are working on reducing manning 
through damage control automation, but there are numerous, different, non-interoperable 
sensors, architectures, and protocols being developed.  No project has tested all of the 
systems required for integrated autonomous Damage Control as envisioned in the ISCS.  
All of the current projects are limited in scope, and even the Naval Research Laboratory’s 
full-scale RT&E mock-ups onboard the ex-USS SHADWELL have not fully integrated 
all of the systems into an overarching decision and execution system.  
A wide variety of sensors and numerous different proprietary protocols and 
interfaces are being used in the different test projects, but there is no standard protocol in 
use by all.  Therefore, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) projects—in particular, 
Reduced Ship Crew by Virtual Presence (RSVP) and Network Fragment Healing 
(NFH)—have parts and pieces that are not directly interoperable with the parts and pieces 
of other research efforts, such as the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Damage Control 
–Automation for Reduced Manning (DC-ARM) project or the Naval Surface Warfare 
Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD) Automated Systems Reconfiguration (ASR) 
project. 
Furthermore, the proposed decision systems are incomplete and likewise require 
both standardization and interface controls.  Neither the Damage Control Tactical 
Management System (DCTMS) software nor the Damage Control Actions Management 
Systems (DCAMS) software meets all of the requirements to realize an automated DC 
with reduced manning. The ISCS architecture developed in this section is a first step 
toward a fully integrated system. 
If a design architecture were to be developed with a standardized set of interfaces 
and protocols for all of the sensors and intelligent agents proposed by ONR, NRL, 
NSWCCD, NAVSEA and other groups investigating the automated DC problems, one 
could easily foresee a system much like the ISCS in the not too distant future.  System 
architecture could then be developed from the ground up, using industry standards for 
interfaces and protocols for all input devices and decision aids.   
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The Navy and its partners in industry must collaborate to combine technologies in 
critical areas.  For example, the Navy needs to work with leaders in Personal Data 
Assistant (PDA) technology and Personnel Locator Service (PLS) systems, as well as 
with medical monitoring device experts.  This would enable development of a PDA with 
PLS functionality, as well as the ability to monitor medical conditions.  Water mist 
systems placed throughout the ship can eliminate manning of fire boundaries, and 
automated closure technology can eliminate the need for manned material boundary 
setting.  Such systems are clearly feasible, but the cost of hardware, software and 
maintenance requires careful analysis. 
Likewise, acquisition professionals must begin to take a system approach to 
damage control design and development issues and get involved with their industry 
counterparts and include them in the ship design process. 
In conclusion, there is no part of the ISCS proposed in this section that could not 
be implemented today if a way could be found to integrate all of the existing, proven 
technologies into one system with the decision software to support it.  The future of 
reduced manning through automated damage control rests on our ability to do this.  If it 
were successful, the Navy could increase overall ship survivability and reduce damage 
control manpower and cost. 
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APPENDIX  E.  REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS OF AN AIRBORNE 
COMMUNICATIONS NODE (ACN) IN SUPPORT OF CROSSBOW 
OPERATIONS57 
 
1. Purpose of Research   
The fundamental advantage for CROSSBOW as a distributed force is its inherent 
ability to survive in a moderate- to low-threat environment and provide formidable 
firepower in the littoral battle-space.  While the appeal for operating in a distributed 
manner is evident, it also has significant potential disadvantages.  The complexity of the 
overall system definitely increases with distributed forces.  This, in turn, increases the 
demand on the Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.  Thus, the need for reliable network 
connectivity becomes even more pivotal. In the absence of a robust network architecture, 
the operational payoffs of distributed forces cannot be realized.  Realizing the significant 
role that the communications infrastructure will play in the context of CROSSBOW 
operations, this research investigates the plausibility of employing an airborne 
communications hub as a method to provide theater-wide connectivity to all 
CROSSBOW forces via an ACN. 
2. Approach 
There are, essentially, two major components in the design specification of the 
CROSSBOW ACN: 1) design specifications of the air vehicle, and 2) design 
specifications of the communications module. 
It is believed that the process of determining the design space of an airborne 
communications UAV that is capable of launch and recovery from the flight deck of the 
SEA ARCHER ship is a more technically daunting task than that of developing a 
modular communications payload.  The advent of miniaturization technology in circuit 
                                                            
57  Based on “Requirement Analysis for an Airborne Communications Node (ACN)” by Foo Khee 
Loon.    This specialized supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report.   
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board design and VLSI technologies makes the eventual development of the 
communications payload a relatively simpler task. 
 Premised on these considerations, we to first define the basic system parameters 
for the air vehicle and fix its key factors, and then analyze the communications 
requirements.  We size the air vehicle’s design space by analysis, using various key 
constraints.  We then compare this space with that available on the SEA ARROW UAV 
to ascertain if a separate aircraft design is needed. In determining the requirements of the 
communications module, various link budget analyses, modulation schemes and error 
correction requirements were studied to identify the general communications system 
requirements. To facilitate the requirement analysis process, we derived a scaled-down 
communications model from the existing USN’s new aircraft carrier Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD).  
3. Results 
Results obtained from the studies above indicate the following preliminary 
conclusions: 
§  An ACN UAV carrying a suitable communications payload, flying at 20,000 
feet can provide adequate coverage of up to 300nm in diameter. 
§ The current SEA ARROW design meets many of the ACN UAV’s 
operational requirements.  However, it is not an optimized solution from the 
fuel consumption perspective, having inadequate volume.  It is envisaged that 
the long-term operating and support cost for using the SEA ARROW to 
conduct ACN operations would not be as cost-effective as a specially 
designed UAV for the ACN.  Hence, we recommend a separate aircraft 
design. SEA ARROW, with its modular payload bay, can be configured to 
conduct ACN operations, but this option should be adopted as a 
contingency—e.g., if all ACN UAV are damaged or non-operational.  
§ Based on the initial estimates for an aircraft to meet CROSSBOW ACN 
requirements, (i.e., 12-hour endurance—eight hours on station time and four 
hours of transit carrying a payload of up to 500 lbs and capable of launch and 
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recovery from SEA ARCHER), the specialized ACN UAV could have a gross 
weight of about 8300 lbs and a wingspan of about 72 feet.   
§ The data link analysis indicates that the proposed communications package for 
the ACN can provide very superior link quality. The communications module 
proposed is designed with Binary Phase Shift Key (BPSK), spread spectrum 
and orthogonal coding scheme. This proposal, while preliminary, shows that 
jamming protection is possible with the ACN concept.  It can provide multiple 
links to ensure network redundancy and survivability. 
§ In order to ensure overall network survivability, a minimum of a four-node 
configuration is proposed. Based on the CROSSBOW force structure of three 
ACN UAVs per SEA ARCHER, the operational profile of the various ACN 
configurations is reflected in the Table 7. This template would enable 








No. of Missions 
over 7 days 
Downtime of 
20% 
No. of Missions per 
Day 
1 8xUAV 10.5 12.6 1.8 
2 16xUAV 5.25 6.312 0.9 
3 24xUAV 3.5 4.2 0.6 
4 32xUAV 2.62 3.14 0.45 
Table 7.  Mission Profile for a Four-Node ACN Configuration 
 
4. Follow-up Actions 
This research has accomplished a limited feasibility analysis of the ACN concept. 
Though the technical computations have not been exhaustive, most of the data derived 
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can be used as a reference model for future detailed design purposes.  We propose that, in 
addition to the communications requirements, the command and control issues for 
CROSSBOW forces be addressed in depth.  The vulnerabilities from operating as a 
distributed force via an ACN are unclear at this juncture.  The overall system level 
complexity for CROSSBOW forces operating distributed should be investigated in order 
to better define the command and control mechanisms needed.  
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APPENDIX F. COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CROSSBOW’S UAV58 
A key attribute of CROSSBOW is the ability to deploy Unmanned Air Vehicles 
(UAV) for surveillance and both air-to-air and air-to-ground strike missions.  Existing 
communication schemes for control of UAVs, such as the Predator and Global Hawk, are 
stovepipe systems and do not address potential interoperability issues when operating a 
large number of UAVs within a joint naval warfare environment.   
  
1. Purpose 
This research paper aims to:  
§ define the UAV59 communication requirements,  
§ identify existing technological developments that CROSSBOW can use,  
§ propose a UAV communication architecture for CROSSBOW and  
§ assess potential limitations of the proposed architecture. 
2. Methodology/Approach 
The problem was approached first by identifying the functional requirements 
using the SEA ARROW operational profiles as reference.  Research into existing UAV 
communication-related developments within the DoD was conducted to identify 
developmental projects that would satisfy CROSSBOW requirements. A communication 
architecture using existing technology was then proposed. Its feasibility and potential 
limitations were assessed using communication design principles. The implementation 
was based on Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) with Binary Phase Shift Keying 
(BPSK) modulation.  In areas where technological solutions were judged not feasible, 
tactical solutions were proposed. 
3. Results  
                                                            
58  Based on “Communications Requirements for CROSSBOW’s UAVs”, by Victor Yeo. This 
specialized supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report.   
59 UAV in this document refers to both ISR UAV and UCAV. UCAV requirements are assumed 
similar to those of UAVs because of lack of experience with UCAVs to date. 
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a.  Requirements 
The fundamental command and control functional requirement of UAVs 
consists of an uplink and a downlink channel.  The uplink channel must be able to send 
command and control instructions for the maneuver of the UAVs, telling them where to 
go, what to see or track, and whether to report or fire its ammunition. The downlink 
channel must be able to provide the operator with the data gathered by the UAVs, 
whether they are images from the various sensors or its location, altitude, direction, or 
target track data.  Based on the developmental trends, the uplink data rate requirement is 
expected to be less than or, at worse, equal to the existing 200 kbps rate used by Predator 
or Global Hawk.  The downlink data rate is expected to follow the MPEG 2 
compression/transmission standard dictated by the Motion Imagery Standards Profile 
(MISP) in Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) 4.0.60 
The functional requirement identified above will require three physical 
components:  1) a Ground Control Station (GCS) on board SEA ARCHER that will allow 
the commander to command and control the UAVs; 2) a communication link that can 
handle the required data rate; and 3) a transceiver unit for both the ship and the UAV.  
Operationally, each SEA ARCHER must be able to control at least eight UAVs 
simultaneously.  Control of the UAVs must be interchangeable among the SEA 
ARCHERs when required. Information downlink from the UAVs must be accessible to 
all surface combatants within CROSSBOW, and it must also be able to hand over UAV 
control to a land-based GCS for ground support missions.     
b.   Existing Developments 
The command, control and communication of the UAVs in CROSSBOW 
will have to fall within the Navy’s C4ISR vision of Joint and Naval Warfare laid out in 
the Navy “Copernicus Concept…Forward.”  This concept goal is the integrated execution 
of four essential functions of C4I: connectivity; common tactical picture; sensor to 
shooter; and information warfare.   The DoD and the Services initiated two developments 
to integrate UAV operations with the services joint C4ISR infrastructure. They are the 
Tactical Control System (TCS) and Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL).   
                                                            
60 MPEG 2 requires a transmission bandwidth of 6-8 Mbps for full color motion image at 30 
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Employment of TCS and TCDL for CROSSBOW’s UAV command and 
control communications must address interoperability issues with existing Navy 
platforms.  The dissemination of UAV collected information to various customers within 
the DoD will be facilitated through the TCS interfaces.  
 c. Proposed Communication Architecture 
A proposed system architecture using TCS for the GCS and TCDL for the 
communication link for CROSSBOW UAV command and control communication is 
shown in Figure 11.  
 
 




TCS’s ability to command and control the large number of UAVs is 
largely a function of software and the user interface.  These should be easily overcome 
with increasing processing power and by adding more user terminals.  The main 
limitation is assumed to lie in the communication link.   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
frames/second. It can be reduced to about 1.5 to 2 Mbps for gray scale motion image. 
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d. Potential Limitations 
TCDL advantages and limitations are investigated through the design of a 
BPSK spread spectrum with Walsh orthogonal coding and Pseudo-Noise (PN) sequences 
communication scheme using TCDL.  Already allocated bandwidth exists for the 
projected uplink/downlink data rate, and the existing L3 Communication’s Air and 
Ground Terminal (AGT) serves as our baseline because we have no access to the Navy’s 
scheme due to security reasons.  Therefore, the selected communication scheme may or 
may not be the scheme currently employed by TCDL.  From the design and analysis 
process, the findings are: 
§ TCDL can support CROSSBOW’s UAV communication requirement of 60 
UCAVs (assuming 200 Kbps uplink and 2 Mbps downlink) and 20 ISR UAVs 
(200 Kbps uplink and 10.71 Mbps downlink) simultaneously. 
§ Number of platforms supportable is dependent on the data rate required. 
§ Jamming protection of 27 dB to 40 dB is attainable, and jamming beyond 
200km is unlikely due to the high power requirement for a fixed jammer. 
§ Jamming on inland missions is possible when the UAVs fly over land at only 
20,000 ft (6 km). 
§ Operation beyond the 200km range of TCDL will have to be addressed by 
Airborne Relay Node (ACN).   
§ Source Routing61 is required to overcome possible obstruction of the line of 
sight channel. 
§ Ku Band SATCOM should be used as a backup to the ACN for redundancy. 
                                                            
61 Dynamic source routing requires several adjacent links to guarantee the availability of an alternate 
route.  This is accomplished by means of a routing protocol where each radio continuously monitors the 
adjacent link performance and updates a routing table for a possible network configuration.  This operates 
very much like a typical Wide Area Network (WAN).   
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4.   Conclusions 
In conclusion, employment of TCS and TCDL for CROSSBOW’s UAV 
communication will address most of the interoperability issues within a Joint theater-
wide operation.  The existence of a developed transceiver product in support of TCS and 
TCDL would cut down developmental time and cost if CROSSBOW were to be 
implemented. 
This study provides the basic command, control and communication design 
requirements and considerations for CROSSBOW UAVs.  These data can be used as a 







APPENDIX G. AN ANALYSIS OF MULTI-SENSOR PAYLOADS FOR THE 
CROSSBOW UAV62 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to propose a baseline multi-sensor payload for the 
CROSSBOW Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR&T) UAV.  The multi-
sensor payload will comprise the following types of payload: 
§ Moving Target Indication/Synthetic Aperture Radar (MTI/SAR) 
§ Electro-Optical/Infrared Sensor (EO/IR) 
§ Electronic Support Measures (ESM) 
§ Common Data Link (CDL) 
The combination of active and passive sensors can make the CROSSBOW UAV 
less vulnerable to enemy detection.  The UAV can switch between active and passive 
modes depending upon the level of hostility of the operating environment. 
2. Methodology/Approach 
The characteristics and performance data of sensors collected from market 
research were used as data in a decision model that determined the optimal payload 
configuration based on certain physical and performance constraints.  Due to the sensitive 
nature of certain sensor technology in R&D, the data collected were limited to those 
sensors that are commercially available and the non-classified specifications of those that 
are in R&D.  Although this may not accurately represent sensor technology in the year 
2020, it can be used as a worst-case capability scenario for the CROSSBOW UAV at this 
time. The physical constraints were imposed by considering a notional CROSSBOW 
UAV platform.  This UAV will be designed to carry the Airborne Communications 
Network (CAN) payload, the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) payload or the ISR&T 
payloads.  The constraints imposed were based on the maximum requirements by each 
type of payload.   The constraints imposed were: 
                                                            
62 Based on “An Analysis of Multi-sensor Payloads for the CROSSBOW UAV,” by Paul Chew.  This 
specialized supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report.   
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§ Maximum payload weight - 500 lbs 
§ Maximum payload volume - 15 ft3 
§ Maximum electrical power - 2 kilowatts 
The performance constraints were based on the sensor’s target identification 
capability and its ability to reject false contacts.  These performance measures were 
represented by utility values derived using the analytical hierarchy process.57   
Cost was used as a variable to determine a list of multi-sensor payloads that 
satisfy the constraints imposed on the model.  Costs were varied from $500k to $5M.  
The relationship between the cost of the payload and its identification (ID) value 
is shown in Figure 12.  The ID value is a utility value derived using the analytical 
hierarchy process, where a pair-wise comparison of the different types of sensors was 
done to determine their relative performance capability.  It represents the ability of the 
sensor system to identify a target of interest.  This is based on the image resolution of the 
 
 
Figure 12.  Cost vs. Identification Value 
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SAR/MTI Radar, EO/IR sensors and the frequency resolution of the ESM sensors.  It was 
found that a positive and roughly proportionate relationship between cost and ID value 
exists.  This relatively linear relationship makes it difficult to identify any region of 
diminishing utility per dollar.  Therefore, a trade-off between cost and performance has to 
be made to determine the optimum baseline payload. 
From the list of payloads derived from the payload selection model, a cost-
performance trade-off analysis was conducted to determine the optimum baseline payload 
for the CROSSBOW UAV.   Table 8 illustrates the performance characteristics of the 
multi-sensor payloads selected from the model.   
Table 8.  Cost vs. Payload Performance Characteristics 
 
The EO/IR and MTI/SAR sensors were represented by the names of their 
manufacturers.58 A numerical value was required for each performance characteristic. 
The EO/IR resolution was converted to a performance scale of one to nine, with nine 
given to the best sensor based on its resolution and whether it has a Laser Range 
Designator (LRD). 
The performance values used describe the ability of the sensor payload to identify 
a target of interest based on its resolution (EO/IR) and maximum detection range for a 
unit area of target in km/m2 (MTI/SAR).  An additional consideration was the inclusion 
of an LRD to provide targeting data and lasing for the missiles fired by the UCAVs or 
SEA LANCE.  For example, in rows seven and eight, the difference in cost of $1M is 
attributed to the increase in EO/IR resolution from 640x480 to 1968x1968.  It can be seen 
in this case that there is a weight decrease of about 14 lbs. This opposing trend is due to 
the way the sensor is manufactured and packaged by Northrop Grumman versus Recon 
Optical. Another example of performance comparison between rows three, six and seven 
Cost(M) Weight (lbs) EO/IR MTI/SAR EO/IR Resolution (Pixels) EO/IR Performance Value
MTI/SAR 
(km/m^2)
1.3 168.1 VERS1 NORGM2 256x256, No LRD 1 14
1.34 161.1 FLIR2 NORGM2 256x256 with LRD 3 14
1.65 213.1 FLIR3 NORGM2 640x480 with LRD 5 14
2.2 217.1 VERS1 GENAT 256x256, No LRD 1 23
2.45 302.1 VERS1 RAY1 256x256, No LRD 1 25
2.8 347.1 FLIR3 RAY1 640x480 with LRD 5 25
2.95 361 NORGM3 RAY1 640x480 with LRD 5 25
3.95 347.1 REC1 RAY1 1968x1968 with LRD 9 25
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shows that, for rows three and six, the main difference in cost of $1.15M is attributed to 
the better SAR/MTI payload installed, which gives a better range of target detection 
capability (14 for row three and 25 for six).  With regard to rows six and seven, there are 
no differences in performance, although there is a difference in cost of $0.15M.  This is 
due to the different prices given by Northrop Grumman vs FLIR Systems for the EO/IR 
systems  
While it is always tempting to select the best and most expensive payloads, one 
has to step back and consider the needs of CROSSBOW.  One of the key tenets of the 
CROSSBOW concept is the need to make every force unit as expendable as possible.  
Expendability would mean lower costs and, more often than not, a less capable system.  
However, the synergistic effects of larger numbers and distribution can compensate for 
this lower capability.  Since the CDL and ESM payloads were the same for all levels of 
total cost, only the EO/IR and MTI/SAR payloads were considered for the trade-off 
analysis.  With this mind, the trade-off parameters and weightings used in the analysis are 




Range/Tgt Size 2 
Payload Weight 2 
TOTAL 10 
Table 9.  Trade-off Analysis Parameters and Weightings 
  
3. Results & Conclusions 





(W) Vol (ft3) EO/IR MTI/SAR ESM CDL 
1.65 213.1 1225 3.357 
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Table 10.   Baseline Multi-Sensor Payload 
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With a weight of only 213 lbs, the payload takes up less than 50 percent of the 
maximum payload weight of the notional CROSSBOW UAV.  This extra weight 
allowance can be used to carry additional fuel to extend the range and endurance of the 
UAV.  This is especially advantageous for ISR&T missions, where demands for range 
and endurance are high. 
Compared to the most expensive and most capable payload, this one costs $2.3M 
less per payload.  It is also lighter by about 135 lbs.  With an inventory of 64 UAVs in 
CROSSBOW, the total saving of $147.2M is a significant amount.  In terms of 
performance, as shown in Table 7, the optimum SAR/MTI target detection capability is 
about 60 percent of the most expensive option, and its EO/IR resolution is about three 
times less.  The higher resolution capability for the most expensive option would mean 
higher bandwidth requirements for data transfer of images.  With a large inventory of 
UAVs, this bandwidth requirement may pose a problem for the common data link and 
communication nodes.   Therefore, the optimum baseline payload strikes a proper balance 
between cost and performance commensurate to the operational concept of CROSSBOW. 
The concept of CROSSBOW as a platform for UAVs and UCAVs will open up 
new avenues and opportunities for unmanned operations.  The more expendable nature of 
UAVs allows them to be used in hostile environments that are too risky for manned 
platforms to operate.  The ability to operate deeper into hostile territory without 
expensive equipment and the risk of human casualties will increase the CINC's sphere of 
influence and help achieve knowledge superiority. 
The introduction of CROSSBOW will increase the market for UAVs and their 
related sensor technologies.  Any indication of a sharp increase in demand for UAVs will 
generate more funding and greater interest in UAV and related technology from the 
commercial world.  History has shown that when such a phenomenon happens, 
technology responds.  A quantum leap in sensor technology may be achieved, thus 




APPENDIX H.   CROSSBOW AIR DEFENSE SUITE63 
 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of this document is to propose the air defense suite for CROSSBOW.  
The study includes threat analysis, concept of air defense operations, evaluation of 
resource utilization and combat potential. Command and control requirements and 
advancements in technology are highlighted.  
 2. Approach 
The concept of air defense for CROSSBOW forces is similar to most existing air 
defense layered concepts, with offensive counter-air as the first layer followed by 
defensive hard and soft kills in subsequent layers.  However, due to the limited firepower 
and capacity of SEA ARCHER, it is not possible to have a full layered air defense similar 
to that of a CVBG.  Hence, a reduced air defense capability for CROSSBOW forces is 
proposed.  
Though the concept of air defense will be similar whether the CROSSBOW force 
is in blue waters or fighting in the littorals, the model for both scenarios can be quite 
different.  Figures 13 and 14 show the two proposed models based on the envisaged 
concept of operations of CROSSBOW forces. 
The model of CROSSBOW Air Defense for blue waters can be conceptualized as 
above. There will be two UAVs for surveillance with a coverage radius of 50 nm at both 
ends of CROSSBOW forces.  The main reasons for having two UAV AEWs are to 
maintain comprehensive surveillance and for redundancy. There will be two CAPs 
forward deployed at a maximum of 50 nm away from the CROSSBOW forces. 
                                                            
63   Based on “CROSSBOW Air Defense Suite,” by Sng Chun Hok.  This specialized supporting study 




Figure 13.  Model of CROSSBOW Air Defense for Blue Water 
 
 
 Figure 14.   Model of Air Defense for Littorals 
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Figure 14 shows a tentative concept of operations with CROSSBOW forces 
operating in the littorals.  The SEA ARCHERs are protected by having some SEA 
LANCEs to the front to absorb enemy fire.  The AEW and CAPs will be deployed 
together with the SEA LANCEs, which are about 35 to 50 nm from the SEA ARCHERs.  
The SEA ARCHERs are also distributed to make targeting efforts more difficult for the 
enemy. 
The detection ring of 50 nm will give sufficient reaction time for the CAPs to 
intercept incoming air and surface platforms.  A simple calculation shows that, from 
CAPs position to intercept, a Mach 2.0 aircraft is about 50 nm (based on 35 nm) away 
from CROSSBOW and from scramble to intercept is about 25 nm.  The SEA LANCEs 
will also assist in destroying the air and surface platforms before they reach the BRL.  In 
addition, the SEA LANCEs will counter sea-skimming missiles launched at 
CROSSBOW.  Any leakages will be countered by other SEA LANCEs (deployed 
together with the SEA ARCHER), as well as by the last layer of defense using CIWS. It 
is important to note that sea-skimming missiles can be detected only when they come out 
of the horizon at about 20 to 30 nm.   
3. Results  
Preliminary investigation shows that an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) radar 
with a detection range of 50 nm is sufficient for operations of CROSSBOW forces in 
both blue water and littoral environments.  The 50-nm detection range will provide early 
warning for one intercept before enemy air platforms reach the Bomb Release Line 
(BRL).  Studies shows that a scaled-down Erieye phased array radar, mounted on a 
UAV,59 with maximum transmission power of 5kW is able to perform the surveillance.  
The total weight of the AEW UAV is approximately 8500 lbs.  A minimum of two 
AEWs can support most of the defensive requirements of air defense. However, if 
required, more AEWs can be deployed to provide the necessary coverage.  It is 
recommended that each SEA ARCHER should have two UAVs dedicated to AEW. 
Two models that make use of the layered concept of air defense of CROSSBOW 
are described, one for blue water operation and the other for littoral operation.  The key 
difference between the two models is the disposition of a belt of SEA LANCE IIs to 
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absorb heavy enemy fire from the land. Both cases show that Combat Air Patrol (CAP) is 
essential for effective countering of enemy air threats before they reach the BRL. 
Resource utilization for air defense operation for CROSSBOW forces is also discussed.  
In short, a minimum of four UAVs for AEW and four to six UCAVs are needed on CAP. 
A proposed shipboard sensor suite would consist of the following: 
§ Multi-function radar (SPY 3) 
§ Air and surface search radar 
§ Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system 
§ Infra-red search and track system 
§ Electro-optical system 
§ Navigation radar 
§ ESM suite 
§ Fire control radar 
The mast with its capability could be similar to that of the SEA LANCEs. 
The force application systems are required for the second and third layer of air 
defenses.  The first layer is the use of UAVs and  UCAVs for CAP and interception. 
The following are some of the last layer of force application systems considered 
to be on SEA ARCHER and, if possible, on SEA LANCE II: 
§ Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) 
§ Free Electron Laser (FEL) 
§ Guns 
A simple trade-off analysis will be conducted to determine if only one of the 
systems can be housed in SEA ARCHER or SEA LANCE II, which, of the force 
application systems mentioned above, will be more suitable in a littoral environment. 
CROSSBOW forces (only SEA LANCE IIs) can destroy 38 Anti-Ship Missiles 
(ASMs) in a time interval of 45 seconds and 77 air platforms in a time interval of 108 
seconds before reaching the last line of air defense.  The terminal air defense could be a 
Free Electron Laser (FEL), Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) and/or guns, as discussed 
below.  Electronic defensive countermeasures are not included in detail because of 
classification difficulties. 
 94 
A simple trade-off analysis for terminal defense evaluates three potential 
configurations: Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), Free Electron Laser (FEL) and guns 
(CIWS).  FEL is the most effective against increasing future ASM threat. The results 
indicate that Free Electron Laser is best if only one weapon system can be installed.  
However, a weapon mix is preferred to ensure that the strengths and weaknesses of the 
systems complement one another in order to have a more balanced and robust force 
application system to deal with a greater variety of threats. 
 Command and control is very important in a sensors-to-shooter environment with 
friendly and enemy forces operating in the same theater.  Requirements for an effective 
and efficient command and control for air defense operations include a complete air 
situational picture with large processing capability and an expert system operating within 
the framework of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC).  The management of the air defense suite is also very important, and a 
“Holographic War Room” and a “Timeline Chart” are envisioned to improve reaction and 




APPENDIX  I.    CROSSBOW MINE COUNTERMEASURE AND TERMINAL 
DEFENSE WEAPONS64  
 
1. Purpose 
In the present era, maritime mines and Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) have 
become readily and cheaply available. They are believed to be the asymmetric weapon- 
of-choice for an adversary with an anti-access strategy.  In order to achieve and maintain 
assured access to the littorals for expeditionary forces that follow, CROSSBOW 
combatants must be equipped with effective mine countermeasure and terminal defense 
weapons.  To this end, this study proposes operational concepts and system architectures 
that will enable the CROSSBOW task force to conduct effective mine countermeasure 
(MCM) operations and orchestrate an effective defense against a coordinated attack 
involving multiple Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) at close ranges. 
2. Methodology/Approach 
In devising a suitable MCM concept for CROSSBOW, the key operational drivers 
of successful MCM operations were identified from the U.S. Navy’s mine warfare 
literature and previous CROSSBOW campaign analyses.  A technological survey was 
then conducted to identify the technological opportunities offered by the Navy’s ongoing 
MCM modernization programs and advances in Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) 
research and development.  Based on the technological survey conducted, the proposed 
CROSSBOW MCM concept was developed to the level of system architecture by 
consideration of feasible technological and platform options. 
Derivation of the critical operational characteristics of an effective terminal 
defense system for CROSSBOW was accomplished employing a stochastic model based 
on the existing Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) as an investigative tool.  The program 
was developed and coded in MATLAB.  Based on the model’s response to coordinated 
attacks involving many ASCMs, a terminal defense concept for CROSSBOW combatants 
                                                            
64   Based on  “A Concept for CROSSBOW Mine Countermeasure and Terminal Defense Weapons,” 
by Lawrence T.C. Lim.  This specialized supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final 
Report.   
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is proposed, followed by an analysis of possible weapon options and key enabling 
technologies required. 
3. Results  
   a. MCM Weapons 
In low- to moderate-threat environments, CROSSOW operations are 
offshore in nature, as there is no requirement to operate within the confines of very 
shallow areas65 (water depths less than 40 ft).  Due to the need to arrive swiftly on the 
scene without being hindered by the threat of maritime mines, CROSSBOW forces must 
be equipped with organic offshore MCM capabilities. With their small size, low 
observability, operational flexibility and unique environmental adaptability, UUVs are 
well poised to play key roles in the CROSSBOW MCM architecture.  The envisioned 
CROSSBOW architecture comprises the following three components: 
§ Long-range mine reconnaissance UUVs. 
§ Mine neutralization assets. 
§ Passive measures. 
The long -range mine reconnaissance UUVs are inserted in advance by 
SEA ARROWs.  A reconnaissance package consists of eight mine-hunter UUVs, and 
four command and control UUVs provide the CROSSBOW task force with the capability 
to reconnoiter eight channels measuring four miles by 1000 yards. Each reconnaissance 
package will be launched by at least six SEA ARROWs, with a number of Combat Air 
Patrol (CAP) SEA ARROWs for protection.  Exploiting the intelligence and 
environmental data collected previously by other Joint and friendly ISR assets, these 
UUVs have the primary tasks of collecting environmental data, localizing gaps and 
weaknesses in the enemy’s minefields, and transmitting the collected information back to 
the CROSSBOW task force on transit via the CROSSBOW Airborne Communications 
Node (ACN) to facilitate follow-on MCM planning.   
Based on the intelligence collected, appropriate MCM neutralization 
assets are then deployed from the SEA ARCHER or SEA LANCE II on transit to 
                                                            
65 Based on the world’s average, the very shallow water region extends about 600 yards or 530 meters 
from the beach.  The region bounded by the very shallow waters is termed inshore. 
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reacquire and destroy the mines using the most appropriate neutralization techniques to 
achieve seamless minefield transit.  The CROSSBOW mine neutralization assets are 
vested in the MH-60 helicopters onboard the SEA ARCHER, which are equipped with a 
suite of five new organic airborne MCM systems, and two semi-submersible vehicles 
launched from SEA LANCE II.  The semi-submersible vehicles comprise a mine hunter 
that directs a mine disposal weapon launched from the SEA LANCE II down onto 
identified mines, as well as a minesweeper  
In addition to active MCM measures, passive MCM measures must also 
be incorporated into the design of individual CROSSBOW combatants.  These include 
the need to control and manage acoustic, magnetic, electric and pressure signatures, as 
well as leveraging on collected environmental data to optimize routes of passage and 
enhance the success of MCM operations. The proposed CROSSBOW MCM architecture 















Figure 15.  Proposed MCM Architecture for CROSSBOW 
Note: RAMICS – Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System, OASIS – Organic Airborne 
and Surface Influence Sweep, AMNS – Airborne Mine Neutralization System, ALMDS – 




When sustained by the CVBG in a Major Theater War (MTW) scenario, 
the CROSSBOW task force should also have the capability to perform limited operations 
against mines and obstacles from the very shallow waters to the beach by deploying 
inshore MCM weapons such as amphibious UUVs and Hydra-7 munitions.  The SEA 
ARROWS or SEA LANCE II can launch these inshore MCM assets.  In this way, more 
CVBG assets may be made available for other strategic missions that require “longer 
reaches.”  
Some of the key enabling technology issues for the MCM concept are: 
§ Incorporating the Synthetic Aperture Sonar (SAS) into a miniaturized UUV 
platform. 
§ Achieving dense power sources with quiet propulsive trains for UUVs. 
§ Bestowing UUVs with the ability to communicate and work intelligently as a 
group. 
§ Establishing interface standards as enablers of UUV payload modularity.   
§ Integrating of the various CROSSBOW MCM platforms into a command and 
control structure that is interoperable with other joint and allied forces. 
b. Terminal Defense Weapons 
To successfully repel a coordinated attack involving multiple ASCMs 
from any direction, rapid reaction of the terminal defense system is key.  Results from the 
RAM model indicate that the probability of staging a successful defense is more sensitive 
to the number of incoming ASCMs than to the engagement ranges.  The results establish 
a need for a terminal defense system comprising small RAM launchers that are suitably 
designed and distributed around the deck of a CROSSBOW combatant to provide 
mutually supportive and all-round defensive fires.  This would ensure near instantaneous 
reaction by negating the need to slew individual RAM launchers into firing positions 
during a multi-directional attack. To establish the trade space for further trade studies, the 
operational characteristics required of each RAM launcher are summarized in decreasing 








Importance         Parameter Requirement Remarks 
1      Reaction Time Less than 1s Time required for decision-
making, derivation of firing 
solutions and firing off of the 
intercept missile from launcher.   




Determined by the accuracy of 
the RAM RF/IR guidance 
system. 
3      Flight Velocity Minimum 
Mach 4  
Ensures at least three intercepts 









Reliability of the guidance 
mechanism on the RAM. 
Probability of Track, 
Pt  
Ability of the shipboard radar 
and RAM RF/IR seeker to track 
the incoming target. 
5 Probability of 
Detection, Pd 
0.90 Requirement is to be able to 
track many targets 
simultaneously. 
 
          Table 11.  Desired Operational Characteristics of a RAM Launcher ranked by     
          degree of importance 
 
The “distributed” RAM system will establish at least three terminal 
defense layers by firing EMP warheads at incoming ASCMs, engaging them 
subsequently with hard kill RAM intercepts and denying any leakers a hit by dispensing 
seduction chaff and IR countermeasures.  The first layer is activated whenever the threat 
of defense saturation is imminent in a particular direction, and the incoming ASCMs can 
be captured within the effective footprint of an EMP RAM warhead.  If the ASCMs are 
approaching the ship from different directions, hard-kill RAM will be employed from the 
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onset.  Significant technological and engineering challenges are involved in realizing the 
proposed terminal defense concept.  They include the miniaturization of an effective 
EMP warhead into the RAM, achieving accurate guidance for the RAM at speeds in 
excess of Mach 4, and engineering a reliable and rapid method of dispensing seduction 
chaff and IR countermeasures in very compressed times.  Based on these considerations, 
an ideal upgrade to the CROSSBOW terminal defense system is the Free Electron Laser 
(FEL).  However, high power outputs in the mega-watts range would first need to be 
demonstrated.  The conceptual low extraction energy recovery FEL configuration is 
ideally suited for shipboard applications as it is compact, requires a small aperture for 




APPENDIX J.     HIGH-SPEED ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE66 
 
1. Purpose 
The high speed of the CROSSBOW ships gives them several advantages over 
slower ships.  However, this also presents significant difficulties for Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW).  The ships of the CROSSBOW will travel at speeds up to 60 knots.  
This speed becomes a factor in these ships’ abilities to detect submarines because the 
faster a ship travels, the more its self-noise will interfere with its sonar’s sensitivity.  
Likewise, flow noise across their sonar arrays will also increase.  Once these vessels 
exceed the breakpoint speed, generally 12-18 knots, this noise will overcome their sonar 
and they will no longer be able to detect submarines.  This could leave CROSSBOW deaf 
both to the approach of a hostile submarine and to torpedo attack. 
The same increase in self-generated machinery and screw noise will also increase 
the relative detection range at which a hostile submarine is able to locate and track these 
high-speed vessels.  This could increase the CROSSBOW’s probability of submarine 
attack.  Therefore, our new high-speed ships will require new technologies and tactics to 
support high-speed ASW. 
This Specialized Supporting Study (SSS) discusses the effects of high speeds on 
ASW tactics and technologies and suggests new tactics that could support this critical 
warfare area. 
2. Methodology/Approach 
This section divides anti-submarine warfare into four key areas:   
§ Search and detection theory, 
§ Sensor technology, 
§ Vulnerability to attack, and 
§ Offensive capability. 
                                                            
66 Based on “High speed anti-submarine warfare,” by David E. Bauer.  This specialized supporting 
study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report.   
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Each area is discussed separately to determine how high speeds affect the ability 
of surface ships to conduct ASW.  This section explores potential technologies and 
suggests alternative methods to conduct ASW while traveling at speeds exceeding 30 
knots.  It also analyzes the vulnerability of CROSSBOW to a submarine attack and 
determines the relative advantages, if any, of high speed over the slower speeds of 
conventional surface ships. 
3. Results  
a. Search and Detection Theory 
It is possible to place a sensor within a manned or unmanned aircraft and 
use that aircraft to establish a high-speed, moving barrier to patrol ahead of the 
CROSSBOW.  This barrier could then be an effective method of conducting ASW for a 
high-speed force. This barrier is scalable and dependent upon six key factors: 
§ CROSSBOW speed, 
§ Estimated hostile submarine speed, 
§ Estimated speed of the hostile submarine’s torpedoes, 
§ Estimated range of the hostile submarine’s torpedoes, 
§ Aircraft speed, and 
§ Sensor capabilities. 
Each factor has significant effects on the physical size of the barrier and 
the amount of resources required to maintain it.  The analysis defines the concept of the 
Submarine Attack Cone of Death (SACD) as a means to relate these factors to the 
problem.  The SACD is then used to determine a Minimum Search Path Length (MSPL) 
that the airborne searcher is required to follow and the Required Sweep Width (RSW) of 
the sensor used.   The actual technique used in any given situation will be a trade-off 
between the speed of the vessels involved and the properties of the sensor used.  The 
number of airborne assets required to escort a high-speed task force though a submarine 
threat area is high.  However, the actual number of assets required is feasible, provided 
that the escorting aircraft have sufficient airspeed, and their sensors have a large sweep 
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width.  The actual calculations and the analysis are discussed at length in the source paper 
in Volume V. 
The question that remains is whether UAVs can support ASW operations.  
Some research has been conducted but, to date, no published accounts of tasking UAVs 
with ASW have been published.  Most UAVs are designed to accomplish the ISRT 
mission.  This involves cameras or radars as sensors, along with processing and 
communication equipment to send the collected data back to the ship or ground control 
station.  The task of ASW requires sensors that can detect a submarine.  The airframe 
would need to be large enough to carry one of the ASW sensors.  The communication 
suite would remain essentially the same.  The sensors discussed in the previous sections 
weigh from 100 to 500 pounds and require between two and eight cubic feet of space, 
depending on the package.  Several production UAVs have the capability to carry 
payloads of this scale. 
Additional work must be performed to determine if it is possible to 
coordinate the operation of several aircraft within the relatively tight confines of the 
SACD.  Likewise, if barrier patrols are to be performed by unmanned aircraft, it is critical 
that technology be developed to allow them to operate in a succinct and coordinated 
manner.    
b. Sensor Technology 
Sensor technology is critical to the success of the type of searches 
described in this analysis.  In order to be useful, the sensors must have the capability to 
rapidly cover a large volume of search area.  They may perform this task individually or 
in concert with other sensors of the same or different types.  Hyper-spectral imagers, 
lasers, sonobuoys, dipping sonars, and magnetic anomaly detectors are each theoretically 
capable of performing the task of high-speed ASW, and they may be placed on either 
manned or unmanned aircraft. 
Hyper-Spectral Imaging (HSI) and lasers offer promising capabilities for 
detecting submarines close to the water’s surface under limited circumstances.  HSI is 
limited to daylight, clear sky use only.  Lasers are less restrictive.  Both are heavily 
affected by water clarity and sea state.  Because of their limitations, additional ASW 
assets would be required to supplement this equipment.  However, it should be noted that 
 104 
both could serve a dual role in ASW and mine warfare.  Further research is required in 
these fields to determine the specific capabilities of these sensor systems. 
Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) is proven technology and will work 
as long as submarines are produced from ferromagnetic materials.  The actual 
performance capabilities of MAD are classified, but it is likely that the useable sweep 
width is measured in hundreds of yards rather than thousands.  This relatively small 
sweep width is impractical for the ASW techniques described in this thesis.  Therefore, 
another sensor should be used in tandem with MAD, or MAD should be reserved for 
localization of submarines rather than for high-speed escort duties. 
Sonobuoys and dipping sonar systems still offer the best performance 
capabilities for detecting submarines.  It is theoretically feasible for a group of aircraft to 
provide an acoustic ASW escort for a group of high-speed vessels.  Given the average 
effective ranges of sonobuoys and active sonar, a flight of four aircraft could provide 
sufficient coverage for nearly all ship speeds.  A field of expendable sonobuoys can be 
quickly laid down in front of a transiting vessel.  However, if the threat region is large, 
the searcher may quickly expend all of his sonobuoys.  For this reason, dipping sonar is 
more attractive, with the drawback being the need for aircraft that can hover.  These 
systems are currently installed on several manned aircraft.  They could also be installed 
on unmanned aircraft; several Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are sufficient to 
perform this task.  However, no known UAV has been designed to carry sonobuoys or 
dipping sonar.  Further research should be conducted in this area. 
The conceptual Expeditionary Sensor Grid (ESG) offers the greatest gain 
with the fewest assets expended for high-speed ASW.  However, the grid must be put 
into place by some other vessel, which would be vulnerable to attack while placing the 
grid.  Likewise, the actual components of the ESG are still under development, and their 
performance capabilities are unproven. 
c. The Vulnerability of CROSSBOW to Submarine Attack 
CROSSBOW will have a significantly reduced vulnerability to submarine 
attack.  Specific advantages include reduced radiated noise, a quieter hull and propulsion 
system design, reduced displacement, and higher speeds.  Each of these will make the 
submarine’s target motion analysis very difficult. 
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d. Offensive Capabilities 
The high speed of the CROSSBOW ships will improve the probability of 
locating a fleeing submarine by minimizing the area in which the submarine can hide.  
Key factors include the surface vessel’s time to arrive on the observed datum and the 
search speed achieved once on station.  CROSSBOW’s high speeds will improve the 
times significantly over slower conventional ships. 
4.  Summary 
This analysis shows that it is theoretically possible to perform a high-speed barrier 
patrol to escort high-speed vessels through a high submarine-threat region.  The task will 
be difficult, but given today’s technology and tactics, it may be the only way to get the 
job done.  The author believes that this analysis shows that further research in this area 

















APPENDIX K.    A CONCEPT FOR IW SUITE IN CROSSBOW67 
 
1. Purpose 
This study in the area of Information Operations (IO) aims to provide a system-
level exploration of the means by which IO can be implemented in the CROSSBOW 
system. Its objectives are: 
§ to identify the Information Warfare (IW) requirements of CROSSBOW that 
could be satisfied by an onboard and independent IW capability  
§ to define a conceptual IW functional architecture. 
The outcome of this effort is the definition of a functional architecture for IW that 
allows CROSSBOW to perform its missions across all theaters independently or as part 
of a joint force. The architecture emphasizes interoperability and the use of unmanned 
vehicles for waging a successful IW campaign. Such a functional description could be 
used to guide future CROSSBOW research efforts by identifying the areas that must be 
developed to enable the conceptual IW suite.  
2. Methodology/Approach 
The study required examination of a relatively new discipline of warfare with a 
variety of definitions and theories. To keep this problem tractable, the author adopted a 
Systems Engineering (SE) methodology. The SE method is a structured approach to 
development that produces a balanced solution to meeting the requirements of the 
problem at hand. Many references describe various realizations of the SE process. 
Generally, the process is represented diagrammatically, as shown in Figure 16. 
Unlike classical system engineering problems, this conceptual IW suite for 
CROSSBOW faces uncertainty in end purpose. It is, to some degree, a solution looking 
for a problem and, thus, is particularly vulnerable to the infamous “error of the third 
kind,” working on the wrong problem. 
 
                                                            
67   Based on “A Concept for an IW Suite In CROSSBOW,” by Ng Cheow Siang. This specialized 











               
Figure 16.   System Engineering Process 
3. Concept Development Process 
The study proceeded in an iterative manner that focused on finding IW 
requirements suitable for CROSSBOW.  As CROSSBOW is a fighting force spearheaded 
by unmanned systems (primarily UCAV and UAV), efforts are made to ensure that the 
requirements can be fulfilled mainly by UCAV and UAVs.  Figure 17 shows an overview 
of the concept development process.  
 
 























Following the SE methodology, the process begins with a requirement analysis to 
define the set of originating requirements for the conceptual IW suite. Meanwhile, the 
development of the functional architecture is based on widely published IW literature and 
an iterative process of comparing the functions with the requirements developed earlier. 
The result is a functional description of the elements of the conceptual IW suite, in the 
form of eleven mission packages.  They show what each function must do and how each 
element can be traced back to the original requirement.   
4. Results  
The conceptual IW suite presented in Figure 18 illustrates the allocation of 
mission packages to top-level functions. The decomposition and allocation process 
revealed that, on the one hand, the “Conduct IO” and “Conduct EW” top-level functions 
produced the most demand on the mission packages. On the other hand, the other top-
level functions produced relatively straightforward mission packages that can be 
configured with the appropriate technologies.  
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Except for the Information Operations Support System (IOSS), which is on board 
the CROSSBOW ships and described in detail below, these mission packages can be 
configured to be loaded on to the UCAV, UAV, or even the MH 60 to be employed in the 
CROSSBOW system.  
a.  IOSS Network 
The IOSS network is the core of the conceptual IW suite. The network 
architecture (see Figure 19) partitions IO mission analysis and planning activities from 
tactical planning and tasking. Operator workstations (clients) coordinate activities on a 
secure local network that includes three servers: 
§ Situation Server - maintains a dynamic database of own and enemy force’s 
critical infrastructure and information infrastructure based on current 
intelligence. Maintains network maps, performance characteristics, 
vulnerability information, geographic information system (spatial and 
geophysical maps), and other intelligence data. The associated intelligence 
workstation performs the automatic correlation of multi-source intelligence to 
create and maintain the current tactical database regarding the targeted 
infrastructure (networks, nodes) and situation (perception, infrastructure 
effectiveness, and functional capability). 
§ Mission Server - maintains a database of current mission activities, tasking, 
resource status, and indications and warnings. 
§ Integrated simulation server - maintains defensive simulations to assess the 
risk to the group’s own information infrastructure. Maintains offensive 
simulations to analyze tactics, countermeasures, and weapons applied to 
targeted information networks. The simulations provide performance metrics 
to quantify the functional effects, collateral damage, and risk associated with 
information operations. 
 The system accepts operational orders and intelligence data from higher-
level echelons and provides output to flow down operational orders, tasking orders, and 
intelligence to lower-level echelons. 
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Figure 19.    IOSS network configuration 
 
5. Conclusion 
This section is an effort to use the system engineering process to bring about a 
conceptual IW suite. Due to limitations in time and classification of system 
specifications, the focus was narrowed onto the initial two steps of SE—requirement 
generation and functional architecting. No physical or technical architecture is specified. 
In the future, when the CROSSBOW concept is ready to fill a need, the development of 
technology will have matured, and a more robust physical architecture can then be 
developed based on the functional architecture. 
Inevitably, the selection of functions (and, therefore, the identification of mission 
packages) is to some extent subjective. Therefore, it is possible that others who perform a 
similar decomposition analysis could end up with a few more or a few fewer required 
packages to support the original set of capabilities. Nevertheless, the main conclusion of 
the analysis is this: an integrated approach to IO can be achieved with relatively small 
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numbers of computers installed on the CROSSBOW ships and mission payloads installed 
on a limited number of unmanned platforms. With forward planning, the CROSSBOW is 
capable of waging a limited IO campaign during its missions to achieve its objectives.  
Through further investigation, CROSSBOW may become more cost-effective through a 




















APPENDIX  L.  KNOWLEDGE PROCESS AND SYSTEM DESIGN FOR 
CROSSBOW ISRT68 
1. Purpose 
Knowledge superiority is envisioned to be a key enabler for future maritime 
operations.  With potentially distributed operations, there is even more reason for the 
CROSSBOW task force to manage its knowledge effectively and efficiently.  This 
section provides an analysis of a proposed Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and 
Targeting (ISRT) process that could be employed by the CROSSBOW forces.  The 
purpose of this study is to define the requirements for knowledge management and 
propose the enabling Information Technology (IT) for the CROSSBOW ISRT systems. 
2. Methodology/Approach 
 Future CROSSBOW operations will not be successful without close support from 
intelligence.  The ISRT process will be key in delivering intelligent knowledge to  
CROSSBOW task forces.  Rather than beginning with the design of the supporting IT, an 
integrated framework for knowledge process and systems design61gives a more complete 
methodology.  
The proposed CROSSBOW ISRT process resembles a proposed USMC 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Targeting Acquisition (RSTA) collection cycle of the 
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). First, the proposed ISRT process is modeled and fed 
into an expert system, KOPeR, for process analysis. The next step is to analyze the 
knowledge flow within the ISRT process for different instantiations of the ISRT process. 
Then contextual and information system analysis and system design identify the 
appropriate enabling information technology for improving the proposed ISRT process 
for CROSSBOW platforms. 
3. Results  
a. Modeling the Process 
                                                            
68 Based on “Knowledge Process and System Design for CROSSBOW ISRT”, by Daniel Siew Hoi 
Kok.  This specialized supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report. 
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Figure 20 shows the modeling of the proposed ISRT process. The overall 
commander’s intention is translated explicitly and disseminated to the individual 
commanders in the other CROSSBOW forces. With this “understanding,” the individual 
commanders make better-informed decisions in prosecuting Close Air Support (CAS) 
and Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions.  
The proposed ISRT process consists of six phases: A) direction, B) 
planning, C) collection, D) process and produce, E) disseminate and F) revalidation. IT-
Support (IT-S) is IT used to convert or transform the input into output. IT-
Communication (IT-C) is IT used to communicate or transfer the output. IT-Automation 
(IT-A) is IT used to automate manual processes. The detailed descriptions of each task 
and other components of the modeled process are described in Volume 5. 
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Figure 20.     Proposed CROSSBOW ISRT Process 
 
b. Knowledge Management Requirements 
Using the integrated framework for knowledge process and system design, 
four requirements to improve knowledge flow within the CROSSBOW are highlighted: 
§ A distributed knowledge repository  
(a) A (b) B (c) C (d) D (e) E (f) F 
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§ Systems that facilitate knowledge exchange 
§ The need to capture and transfer tacit knowledge  
§ The proper “pulling” and “pushing” of knowledge 
c. Improved ISRT Process using Enabling Technology 
Based on the KOPeR diagnosis, the author focuses on IT.  Although there 
are several IT systems supporting knowledge management, this study focuses on three of 
them: 1) knowledge repository, 2) Knowledge-Based Systems (KBS) and 3) Intelligent 
Agents (IA). 
A knowledge repository is a collection of both internal and external 
knowledge. Informal knowledge repositories seek to capture tacit knowledge that resides 
in the minds of experts within the organization but has not been put in a structured 
format.  Explicit knowledge has generally been captured in some form that should be 
filtered, organized and stored in a central knowledge repository.  Groupware, as part of a 
knowledge repository system, refers to software products that provide collaborative 
support to groups to share opinions, data, information, knowledge and other resources. 
Through collaboration and discussion, knowledge is evoked, then captured and stored in 
the knowledge repository.  This technology will improve the transfer of tacit knowledge 
to subordinate commanders.  The knowledge repository will also help in better decision-
making for subsequent CAS or SEAD missions and for future CROSSBOW 
deployments.  The ability to replicate the knowledge repository is important to the 
distributed nature of the CROSSBOW task forces.  By establishing a proper knowledge 
repository within the CROSSBOW force, commanders will be able to retrieve important 
experiences, insight and understanding.  Also, implementation of the groupware tool can 
improve the IT communication in Phases A and E by allowing CROSSBOW 
commanders to conduct discussions and exchange information and knowledge 
conveniently. 
KBS uses human knowledge captured in a computer to solve problems 
that ordinarily require human expertise.  Well-designed systems imitate the same 
reasoning process experts use to solve specific problems.  Such systems can be used by 
experts as knowledgeable assistants for improved, consistent results.  The interpretation 
capability of a KBS will help intelligence officers produce the intelligence product during 
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Phase D. At the same time, the planning capability of the KBS will assist the ISRT group 
in planning the ISRT mission during Phase B.  For both tasks, besides all the operational 
and doctrinal manuals, the intelligence officers and the ISRT group planning staffs will 
have to codify and store their knowledge, expertise and experience in the KBS prior to 
using it. Once operational, the KBS can interact and assist the group in producing the 
intelligence product and the mission planning.  Besides improving the IT support for both 
Phases B and D, KBS also allows effective dissemination of knowledge to users through 
an interface.  As such, the application of KBS also increases the IT communication for 
Phases B, D and E.  Implementation of the knowledge repository and KBS are not trivial. 
However, they are proven technologies that have established themselves commercially 
and that are gaining military acceptance.   
Both repository and KBS technologies require users to search through the 
knowledge repository or database.  But in real-time combat situations, time is critical and 
information overload will be costly.  IA are software entities that carry out some 
operations on behalf of a user or another program, with some degree of independence or 
autonomy by employing some knowledge or representation of the user’s goals.  They 
save time by deciding which information is relevant to the user. With these agents, 
decision-making ability is enhanced by information rather than paralyzed by too much 
input, as discussed below.  
In finding indications and warnings (I&W) for both CAS and SEAD 
missions, information must be retrieved from distributed, heterogeneous data sources, 
correlated and combined, and then evaluated for the likelihood that a threat or target 
exists.  Operators will need intimate knowledge of applicable databases and a significant 
chunk of time to manually perform the necessary search, analysis and monitoring. 
CROSSBOW can adopt IA technology to perform the task of identifying and locating 
CAS and SEAD targets. Once a target is identified, the ISRT group and the CAS/SEAD 
mission commanders can then task the ISRT UAVs and UCAVs, respectively. Thus, IA 
technology in this case will improve the IT communication and automation for both 
Phases D and E.  
 116 






Process A B C D E F 
Task Direction Planning Collect Process & 
Produce 
Disseminate Revalidation 
IT-S MS Office 
tools 




IT-C Groupware KBS - KBS, IA Groupware, 
KBS, IA 
- 
IT-A - - Collection 
systems 
IA IA - 
 
Figure 21.  Improved CROSSBOW ISRT Process 
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APPENDIX M.     TRAINING69 
 
CROSSBOW is a new concept with operational capability envisioned in 2020. 
The purpose of this section is to address human engineering issues that can affect 
manning, training, deployment cycles, and design.  CROSSBOW will be on the cutting 
edge of automation and robotics.  Manning will be austere, and intelligent machines will 
perform many of the tasks now performed by people.  This will require crews with a high 
degree of intelligence and specialized training.  The training investment, much of which 
may be specific to CROSSBOW, may mitigate in favor of a CROSSBOW career path, 
and a dedicated CROSSBOW community may be appropriate. With eighteen years of 
deployment lead-time, there is time to re-examine existing manpower and training 
concepts, and, if necessary, begin with a clean slate.  This exploratory study identifies 
some of the critical training issues raised by CROSSBOW and suggests some directions 
that may prove fruitful.  New training concepts may require significant new 
infrastructure, so early definition of the manning and training requirements is important. 
After identifying unique factors in CROSSBOW manning and training, a number 
of conclusions were reached: 
§ CROSSBOW ships should be manned with specialized teams.  Emphasis 
should be placed on determining the best composition of individual skills and 
redundancy. 
§ Advancements in simulation and automated technology permits austere 
manning, but only with capable and well-trained people. 
§ A dedicated support office is probably necessary to make the concept work.   
§ New manning concepts could enable CROSSBOW to be on station 18 of 24 
months by adjusting the deployment cycle.  The crew would report to the ship 
as an integrated team after a year of specialized training, consisting of three 
months of individual training followed by three months of team training and 
ending with six months of individual specialization. 
§ Deployments of three months would be followed by one month in port. 
                                                            
69 Based on “An Exploratory Study of Training Requirements for CROSSBOW,” by Bruce George 
Schuette.  This specialized supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report. 
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In order to implement this training concept, five [you list six] actions need to be 
taken: 
§ Crews must be trained as specialized teams. 
§ Gaming, simulation, and virtual reality must be developed and used. 
§ New materials must be developed to educate crews and maintain currency in 
rapidly changing technologies essential to CROSSBOW—e.g., robotics and 
expert systems. 
§ Attitude change and team building probably require that some training be 
conducted underway. 
§ Passionate dedication to system reliability and maintainability needs to be an 
important priority to all participants in the CROSSBOW evolution. 
§ The on-shore infrastructure must be developed that can support CROSSBOW 
while it is both underway and in port. 
It should be emphasized that all of these actions must be taken together in order to 
get results.  One cannot wait to see what is required after CROSSBOW is built.  
Engineering teams need to design the ships, infrastructure, and human elements 
concurrently in order to maximize the CROSSBOW potential.  This is especially true of 
the manpower and training programs. 
Lastly, today the CROSSBOW training concept is just that—a concept.  It needs 
to become a pilot program that changes and evolves as CROSSBOW evolves.  If pursued 
vigorously, it can lead to formidable training innovations that not only take advantage of 










APPENDIX N.  REFUELING ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES FOR 
CROSSBOW70 
 
 This section examines alternative methods for refueling crossbow and 
estimates the amount of fuel required for a notional mission. 
 
1. Purpose 
Current refueling assets and techniques cannot sustain CROSSBOW as it transits 
at high speed to an area of operations.  Moreover, in most scenarios, without prior 
warning, there will not be enough time to assemble the necessary fuel support.  This 
section addresses this problem. 
2. Methodology/Approach 
A series of EXCEL spreadsheets were used to predict refueling requirements for 
CROSSBOW.  Amounts of fuel carried, consumed, and needed for refueling are 
estimated for one specific mission profile.  Additionally, research was performed to 
generate timely alternative methods for delivering the required fuel to CROSSBOW 
efficiently. 
3. Alternatives  
This section examines alternative methods and platforms capable of meeting the 
refueling and re-supply needs of CROSSBOW.  These alternatives are named and 
described briefly as follows: 
§ SEA QUIVER is a notional Station Ship for CROSSBOW. It needs to transit at an 
average speed of 40 knots and carry at least 11,000 tons of fuel.  In addition to fuel, 
SEA QUIVER would provide maintenance, a limited range of parts and food, and 
ammunition. 
§ The problem presented by refueling a fast naval force is moving large quantities of 
fuel over long distances quickly enough to meet military deployment and contingency 
                                                            
70 Based on “Refueling issues and alternatives for CROSSBOW,” by Paul R. Darling.  This 
specialized supporting study is in Volume V, part 1 of the CROSSBOW Final Report. 
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needs.  Commercial developments of high-speed vessels (HSVs) offer viable 
alternatives to the traditional ship hull.  HSVs operate at greater speeds and more 
economically than conventionally hulled ships.  A bulk fuel carrier HSV, with a cargo 
capacity of 11,000 tons, would support the CROSSBOW forces at sea and meet the 
rapid deployment fuel reserve requirements. 
§ Modern airships provide a fast and economical logistic alternative to conventional 
shipping.  Unlike airplanes and seaplanes, airships rely on an envelope of helium to 
maintain lift and do not require a prepared landing field when delivering cargo.  Also, 
rough seas do not hamper the airship since it does not “land” on the water.  
Commercial companies have designs for airships with lifting capacities of over 1,300 
tons. 
§ A proposed use for the aging TRIDENT-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is 
to convert them into nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN). Another 
use for these submarines would be to remove the missiles and build fuel tanks inside 
the missile spaces, thus converting the SSBN into a nuclear-powered submarine 
tanker (SSTN) with a 323-ton cargo capacity. 
§ The Mobile Operating Base (MOB) is a self-powered, semi-submersible supply and 
theater vessel.  Modular sections connect serially in order to create an airstrip capable 
of landing, unloading, and launching conventional fixed-wing aircraft, such as the C-
130 and C-17 cargo planes (Zaccola 2000).  As conceived, the MOB is better suited 
than any other ship alternative to realize the at-sea transfer of logistical supplies from 
tankers and container ships. 
§ Modularity is an integral part of the CROSSBOW concept.  From unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) and SEA ARROWs to the internal workings of SEA ARCHER and 
SEA LANCE II, a modular approach saves time, manpower, weight, and money.  If 
SEA ARCHER and SEA LANCE II are to accommodate modular fuel tanks (MFT) 
onboard, the initial design must address this requirement.  By making the fuel tanks 
modular, the current method of refueling is replaced by simply switching out one or 
more tanks.  Once the MFT has been emptied, it can simply be removed and slid out 
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of place using hydraulics and winches, and then a new one can be inserted while at 
sea.  An MFT is designed to hold 110 tons of fuel. 
 
4. Results 
Results of the research indicated the following: 
§ SEA QUIVER offers a viable method for delivering fuel to CROSSBOW and 
lends itself to the distributed force concept when used as a station ship.  A 
need exists to replenish via a system of shuttle ships or shuttle planes.  The 
AO/AOE, HSV, or airship can meet the shuttle requirement. 
§ Automated refueling is being explored and would allow reduced manning of 
future Navy ships. 
§ Moving cargo across the ocean and around the world quickly via airplanes far 
exceeds current capability.  The use of airships or Wing in Ground Effect 
vehicles may offer economical alternatives to conventional airplanes. 
§ In the event that foreign forward basing is not available or adequate, a Mobile 
Offshore Base offers a technologically feasible alternative, while providing 
logistical support for forward-deployed ships. 
Results of the spreadsheet models indicated the following: 
§ In order to complete the 15-day mission described in this study, 79,000 tons of 
fuel are required by CROSSBOW in the area of operation. 
§ Four SEA QUIVERs, with a cargo fuel capacity of 11,000 tons each, are 
adequate to meet the transit and on-station mission requirement for fuel. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In order to limit the size of the CROSSBOW ships, a ten-percent fuel reserve has 
been incorporated into the ship designs.  We acknowledge that the current standard 
operating procedure for the U.S. Navy is to refuel at fifty percent, as set forth by fleet 
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commanders and Operational Orders.  Given current technology, we recommend the use 
of SEA QUIVER to meet the logistical needs of CROSSBOW.  In support of SEA 
QUIVER, the MOB can provide a logistical re-supply base.  Airships offer many 
advantages and may work well as a shuttle ship for SEA QUIVER. 
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